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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTIONS, ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
) CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
Petitioner, ) 
v. ) Case No. 940179-CA 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD ) Priority 14 
and MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL, ) 
Respondents. ) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Utah Career 
Service Review Board (CSRB), an agency of state government. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court under Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-6 (1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
A formal evidentiary hearing was held pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 67-19a-404, 405, and 406 (1992) before a CSRB hearing 
officer appointed pursuant to section 404. The hearing officer 
held a multi-day hearing beginning on August 11, 1992 and conclud-
ing April 12, 1993. Thereafter the hearing officer rendered a 
decision which consisted of his findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and a discussion of his decision (R.8-26). The Department of 
Corrections (Corrections) appealed the hearing officer's decision 
to the CSRB pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-407 (1992). The 
Career Service Review Board issued its decision on February 23, 
1994 (Addendum E, Corrections Addenda volume accompanying its 
brief, R.91-124). Corrections thereafter filed its appeal with 
this court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the CSRB act within its statutory authority in 
requiring an evidentiary hearing in this matter and relying on its 
hearing officers findings of fact as the official record of the 
hearing and not giving deference to Corrections' findings of fact? 
An agency's interpretation or construction of general law is 
reviewed without deference to the agency but is viewed on a 
correctness standard. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 
P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). An agency's application of its own 
rules is reviewed in an intermediate standard of reasonableness and 
rationality. Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678 
(Utah App. 1993). 
2. Does the CSRB have the right to conduct formal de novo 
evidentiary hearings under its statutory provisions when the 
hearing before Corrections was not subject to the Utah Administra-
tive Procedures Act (UAPA) and was not part of the formal grievance 
procedures as set forth by statute? 
An agency's interpretation or construction of general law is 
reviewed without deference to the agency but is viewed on a 
correctness standard. See: Morton, Id. 
3. Is it appropriate for the CSRB to retain jurisdiction 
over matters once appealed to it where changed circumstances become 
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known during the appeal process but which are fully aired at the 
evidentiary hearing? 
An agency's interpretation or construction of general law is 
reviewed without deference to the agency but is viewed on a 
correctness standard. See; Morton, Id. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutes and rules applicable to this matter are either 
cited in the text of the brief or appear in the Addendums. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent, CSRB, acknowledged in its entry of appearance that 
it would limit its discussion in this matter to the procedural and 
jurisdictional issues it has been asked to address. Therefore it 
will not set forth its own statement of the case. While the CSRB 
does not agree fully witH either of the statements found in 
Petitioner's and Respondent Hummel's briefs, it believes that 
Respondent Hummel (Hummel) is more accurate in its statement of the 
case and agrees that Petitioner's statement is more argumentative 
than a statement. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The CSRB has already set forth in its decision what it sees 
are the relevant facts of this case. It chooses not to address 
further the facts of the actual hearing and refers the court to the 
voluminous recitation of the facts in its Decision. It does, 
however, desire to set forth a few facts relevant to the issues of 
jurisdiction which it feels are relevant to its argument. 
3 
A series of allegations (charges) were made against Hummel in 
the form of an Administrative Complaint filed against him by the 
Inspector General's Division of the Department of Corrections 
(Addendum A in Corrections Reply Brief, R. 267-270). As part of the 
complaint, Hummel was ordered to appear before Administrative Law 
Judge Spencer Robinson for a hearing on the charges (R. 270). A 
hearing on the charges was held on April 25, 1990 (R.271). 
A Report and Recommendation was issued by the Administrative 
Law Judge to management of Corrections regarding the charges on May 
10, 1991 (Addendum B in Corrections Addenda volume to its brief, 
Agency Exhibit 18, R.271-281). The Report found certain of the 
charges were true and recommended that the charges so found 
justified disciplinary action. The Administrative Law Judge did 
not impose discipline or give Hummel notice of intent to disci-
pline, but suggested a range of what he thought was appropriate 
discipline if management chose to impose discipline. The Report 
and Recommendation was not a notice of disciplinary actions but 
suggested that the range of discipline included suspension to 
termination (R.281). 
Upon receipt of the Report and recommendation, O. Lane 
McCotter, then Deputy Director of Corrections recommended to 
executive director Gary W. Deland that Hummel be terminated. 
Hummel was given notice of the recommended termination and the 
reasons therefore by letter dated May 14, 1991. Hummel requested 
an appellate hearing on the intent to terminate him from employment 
(R.282). An appellate hearing (4th Level hearing under the CSRB 
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statutes) was held with Deputy Director David Franchina on May 23, 
1991 (R.282). Mr. Franchina issued a Final Order, 89 GWD 39 
sustaining the recommendation of termination (Addendum C in 
Corrections Addenda volume to its brief, Agency Exhibit 19, R.282-
83) . The Final Order recited the procedural history as to that 
stated in this paragraph. 
Mr. Franchina's Order dated May 28, 1991, following the 
department level appeal hearing, was the decision of termination 
from which Hummel appealed to the CSRB. 
After Judge Richard Moffat of the Third Judicial District 
Court granted Hummel's Writ of Habeas Corpus and set aside his 
conviction for child abuse, counsel for Hummel made several 
attempts to resolve the issue with Corrections to no avail. On 
virtually the eve of when the matter was set for hearing and after 
six months of knowledge of the setting aside of the conviction, 
Corrections attempted to have the matter remanded. The request was 
denied and the matter was ordered to proceed to formal hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Historically and pursuant to statute, the CSRB and its 
predecessors have conducted evidentiary hearings where the hearing 
officer has been the fact finder for purposes of reviewing a de-
partment head's decision. These evidentiary hearings have been in 
the form of de novo reviews wherein no deference was given to the 
findings of departments. Deference, however, was given to the 
ultimate decision of discipline to determine whether the facts as 
found by the hearing officer supported the decision of the 
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department head or whether that decision was an abuse pf discre-
tion. 
The hearing held before Corrections' ALJ was based on a 
complaint filed against the employee and was really part of the 
investigative process. Only after the ALJ determined that the 
employee had violated policy and that those violations justified 
discipline did he issue a Report and Recommendation suggesting that 
discipline be imposed. It was only then that the employee was 
notified that disciplinary action was pending and he was given a 
right to a hearing before the executive director's designee. The 
hearing before the ALJ was not subject to UAPA nor was it part of 
the grievance process. As such# the only formal hearing under UAPA 
was the evidentiary hearing before the CSRB's hearing officer. 
Hearings of a de novo nature inherently are different than 
previous hearings since new evidence can be introduced and since 
the hearing officer is not bound by what took place at the former 
hearing. Changed circumstances, as long as they are aired in full 
before the hearing officer are legitimate matters to be heard by 
the CSRB and do not mandate that matters be remanded to the 
department. The CSRB has the authority to determine the facts as 
found at the time of the hearing and determine whether the facts as 
presented support the decision of the department head or whether 
the discipline should be modified because to do otherwise would 




THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD AND ITS PREDE-
CESSORS HAVE ALWAYS HELD DE NOVO EVIDENTIARY 
HEARINGS PURSUANT TO STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
GRANTED TO THEM WITH NO DEFERENCE TO AN AGEN-
CY' S DECLARATION OF WHAT IT BELIEVES THE FACTS 
TO BE. 
Counsel for Corrections, at page 17 of Corrections' brief, 
misstates not only the historical but the current statutory role of 
the CSRB and its predecessors. Over the years, statutes and rules 
have been implemented and carried out consistently with what has 
taken place in this case. Corrections' argument that the CSRB has 
exceeded its authority and "changed its rule" in the middle of the 
Hummel matter to be something different than what the CSRB had done 
previously is untrue and not supported by law or history. 
The misstatement and misunderstanding becomes the basis upon 
which Corrections claims that the CSRB has acted beyond the scope 
of its authority. Corrections states as follows: 
The focus of the old rule was on the agency's 
findings of fact; the CSRB hearing officer 
simply reviewed those findings and their 
evidentiary basis to determine if the findings 
were supported by more than a trace of evi-
dence that a reasonable person would find 
credible. The hearing officer was not a 
factfinder but had the limited role of assur-
ing that some credible evidence underlay the 
agency's action. 
Petitioners Brief, p. 17 (emphasis added). 
Correction of this misstatement is necessary for the Court to 
understand the role of the CSRB as well as the focus on the 
appropriate rules. The CSRB hearing officer and the CSRB as a body 
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have never operated within its statutory scheme as .stated by 
Corrections. Hearing officers have always been fact finders and 
have given deference to the ultimate decision of the department, 
not the findings of a department. 
Of the twenty some odd departments in Utah State government, 
the overwhelming majority of them hold no formal hearings, prepare 
no "findings of fact" and simply submit a letter to an employee 
outlining what allegations they believe justify the discipline 
imposed. Corrections and a few other departments hold more 
formalized review processes wherein a designee of the executive 
director prepares findings of fact. These are the exceptions. To 
state that hearing officers, by rule, focus on an agency's findings 
of fact is unfounded. 
Counsel for the Board has acted as counsel for agencies in 
approximately 50 evidentiary hearings before the CSRB and its 
predecessors (Merit System Council and the Personnel Review Board) 
since 1977. At no time has he ever known the Board or any of its 
predecessors to unilaterally do as counsel for Corrections has 
stated. 
Counsel is aware of and has participated in parties stipulat-
ing that agency findings be adopted by hearing officers as true. 
Normally this was done as parties argued issues of law rather than 
issues of fact. Also, he is aware that parties have stipulated 
that hearing officers could consider evidence, decisions, tran-
scripts, etc. that had been generated and introduced in department 
level hearings. Such evidence, however, was not introduced as 
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conclusive proof that the facts were true, but as added Evidence in 
the "new hearing" to support a party's position that there was 
either substantial evidence to support the allegations made by the 
agency or from the employee's perspective, there was insufficient 
evidence to meet the evidentiary burdens established by rule and 
statute. 
The earliest predecessor to the CSRB of which Counsel is aware 
is the Merit System Council (Council) . It was a five member 
council established to hear, among other things, appeals of 
terminations. The Council was established by the Utah Legislature 
in 1965. Its authority was found at Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14 
(1969) . Addendum A to this brief contain the code sections 
relative to this aspect of the Council's authority. At Subsection 
(d) and (e) is found: 
(d) An employee who is aggrieved by a deci-
sion of his department head may appeal the 
decision to the merit system council which 
shall set a time and date for hearing of the 
appeal... 
(e) Disciplinary actions shall be supported 
by credible evidence, but the normal rules of 
evidence in courts of law shall not apply in 
hearings before the department or merit system 
council. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14(d) and (e) (1969, emphasis added). 
Hearings before the Council included the introduction of 
evidence to support the decision of the department head. The 
earliest published rules of the Council that counsel for the CSRB 
was able to find were effective August 28, 1974 and pertinent 
portions of those rules are included as Addendum B to this brief. 
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Those rules spell out in detail how hearings before the Council 
would be handled including the introduction of evidence and 
examination of witnesses. Under ARTICLE III - APPEALS, is found 
the procedure for hearings. At Article III, Section 2, paragraph 
2b.(2) is found, for example: 
When the agency representative has finished 
with his oral statements or has stated that he 
has none to make, he may introduce witnesses 
or material evidence in support of the agen-
cy's action. (Emphasis added). 
Thereafter is contained a series of provisions which directly 
provide for the presentation of evidence, witnesses, questions and 
answers from interested parties in a cross examination format. The 
rule at Article III, Section 2, paragraph 2c as it relates to the 
employee's case contains the following language: 
"Presentation of the appellant's case -- the 
procedure here shall be exactly the same as 
that for presentation of the case of the 
agency except that the roles of the agency 
representative and witnesses and those of the 
appellant and his witnesses shall be reversed. 
(Emphasis added). 
According to Article III, Paragraph 3, the Council was then 
required to make a written summary of the hearing and prepare its 
decision. 
While the Council was in existence since 1965, counsel for the 
CSRB is unaware of any formal decisions rendered by the Council 
prior to 1977. This is not to say the Council did not hear and 
decide cases, but over the years, as counsel has been involved with 
personnel issues, he has attempted to locate every decision 
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rendered by the Council and has been unable to locate any decisions 
prior to that date. 
Counsel is not aware of Corrections being a party to any of 
the hearings before the Council from 1977 until the Council's 
repeal in 1979. However, its parent department, the Department of 
Social Services, of which Corrections was a division at the time, 
was the subject of nine of eighteen evidentiary hearings before the 
five member Council for which formal decisions were issued. In all 
such decisions, the Council issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and rendered a decision. One of those decisions, In the Matter 
of the Appeal of Stanley J. Konkol, MSC 78-5 (1978) is attached as 
Addendum C to this brief to show the nature of the process used. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Department of Community and Economic 
Development v. Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980) 
recognized the Council's evidentiary de novo hearing process when 
it stated: 
Yet in this case, the State, in accordance 
with the Merit Council procedural rules and 
because of the nature of the case involved, 
should also be allowed to have its representa-
tive in attendance at the Council hearing in 
order to present, or assist in presenting, the 
State's case in chief and rebuttal evidence, 
and to conduct or assist in conducting cross-
examination to assure an accurate and complete 
disclosure of facts. 
614 P.2d at 1262 (emphasis added). 
The Personnel Review Board (PRB) was created by the 1979 Utah 
Legislature. The PRB's authority, as well as the statutory 
authority for the Division of Personnel Management and its 
successors including the current Department of Human Resource 
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Management, was found in the Personnel Management Act,.. Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-1 et. seq. Also included was a very specific 
statutory procedure for hearings before the hearing officers 
appointed by the PRB. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-25(5) (1979 Supp.) states in part: 
Informal rules of evidence and procedure are 
applicable at such hearings. The aggrieved 
employee and employer may, in addition to the 
provisions of 67-19-22, be present at all 
hearings, produce witnesses, examine and cross 
examine witnesses. and examine documentary 
evidence. A tape recording of the proceedings 
shall be made and the transcript of the pro-
ceedings shall constitute the record of the 
hearing. 
The hearing officer shall render a written 
decision supported by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law within 15 working days 
after the hearing. (Emphasis added). 
While this language seems unmistakably clear, the PRB enacted 
rules delineating the exact nature of the appeals hearing which was 
an evidentiary de novo hearing conducted by the hearing officer. 
In Utah Dept. of Corrections v. Sucher, 796 P.2d 721 (Utah App. 
1990), this court specifically recognized the rules and provisions 
by which the Board reviewed the record established by the hearing 
officer. Therein this court acknowledged that the hearing officer 
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law from which the PRB 
reviewed the matter on appeal. This court stated: 
The PRB, in reviewing the hearing officer's 
decision, found that the facts supported the 
charge against Sucher. The PRB decision 
further stated that the hearing officer's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law were 
supported by the evidence... 
796 P.2d at 723 (emphasis added). 
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The first formal rules of the PRB were published in 1981, 
although the rules had been adopted earlier and hearings had been 
conducted according to them since the inception of the PRB. Rule 
20.0, SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A HEARING, delineates the very essence 
of de novo hearings as well as the requirement under Rule 20.8 that 
the hearing officer "will make and enter a written decision and 
order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law." See 
Addendum D of this brief. 
The PRB rules were modified and refined over the years and the 
rules cited by this court in Sucher were consistent with the 
earlier rules. In all instances, the hearings were evidentiary, 
regardless of what took place at the department level. Hearing 
officers prepared their own findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, and rendered decisions based on their findings of fact. 
In 1989, the PRB was renamed the Career Service Review Board 
with its statutory authority being removed from the Personnel 
Management Act and a separate statute was enacted for the CSRB 
alone. This change is found at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. 
(Supp. 1989). There are several provisions of this act which 
specifically authorize the Board to hold evidentiary de novo 
hearings. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-202 (3) and 204(2) (a) (ii) , CSRB 
board members and the administrator have the right to subpoena 
witnesses, documents and other evidence for hearings over which it 
has jurisdiction. The Administrator, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
67-19a-204(2)(b) selects a hearing officer to "adjudicate and 
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resolve personnel administration disputes". Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-303, employees may call other employees as witnesses at 
all hearings. Further, under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-404(1), the 
administrator, upon determining that a grievance meets the 
jurisdictional requirements appoints a hearing officer "to 
adjudicate the complaint". 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-405 provides for a pre-hearing 
conference at which time issues to be heard are set forth, facts 
are stipulated to, if possible, lists "of witnesses, exhibits and 
papers or other evidence that each party intends to offer as 
evidence" are exchanged and established. 
The official record of the proceedings is not the department 
level hearing record but that established at the hearing officer 
level. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406 (1) (b) clearly establishes that 
the verbatim court reporter record and "all exhibits, briefs, 
motions, and pleadings received by the hearing officer are the 
official record of the proceedings" (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(c) sets forth the "burden of 
proof" for the hearing. That burden is an evidentiary burden. The 
party with the burden of proof must prove the case before the 
hearing officer by "substantial evidence." Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-408 any appeal to the CSRB will be made on the 
official record of the hearing officer's hearing (transcript and 
exhibits, briefs, etc.) as pointed out above. That official record 
is not the record created at the department level except as 
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introduced and used as evidence in the evidentiary hearing before 
the hearing officer. 
The CSRB issued revised rules in December 1989 addressing the 
newly enacted statutory scheme. These rules are found under its 
then assigned number, R140, there having been a renumbering of 
rules from those cited in Sucher. Of particular note is Rule 140-
1-20.C. Utah Admin. Code 1990 (Addendum E). 
Counsel for Corrections cites that rule from the 1992 Utah 
Admin. Code as Rule R137-1-20.C (1992), there again being a rule 
number change from 140 to 137. While the citation of the rule is 
correct, she misstates the focus and historical import of the rule 
as it relates to the hearings held by hearing officers. Correc-
tions argues on pages 16-18 of its brief that the CSRB has changed 
its rule to do away with deference to an agency's findings of fact. 
The rule cited by Corrections as well as all prior rules and 
statutes never gave deference to an agency's findings of fact. The 
old rule, as Corrections refers to it, is consistent with the new 
rule cited by it. Both the "old" rule and the "new" rule give 
deference to the "decision" of the department head. What is that 
decision? It is the ultimate disciplinary action taken against an 
employee based on the facts established at the CSRB hearing. Utah 
Admin. Code R140-1-20C. (1990) , the same rule cited by Corrections, 
states as follows: 
An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new 
hearing for the record, with both parties 
being accorded full administrative due pro-
cess. The hearing officer shall give latitude 
and deference to an agency's prior decision 




of fact based on the evidence. (Emphasis 
added). 
The "new rule," as alluded to by Corrections, was not a "new 
rule" regarding deference, but a clarification of what had been the 
rule and practice for years. Each version of the rule states that 
there will be a "new hearing for the record." Utah Code Ann. § 67-
19a-406(1)(b) explicitly states that the "record" of the hearing 
consists of the exhibits, transcript, evidence and testimony 
presented at the step 5 hearing. That is the "new hearing" 
referred to in rule and supported in statute. 
As pointed out, the CSRB statutes, as well as the statutes of 
its predecessors, provided de novo evidentiary hearings for those 
employees appealing matters to the CSRB. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-
202(1) (a) sets forth the jurisdiction of the Board as that of "to 
review appeals from career service employees and agencies of 
decisions about...dismissals..." (emphasis added). Thereafter is 
found the process for evidentiary hearings to fulfill that mandate. 
It is the "decision" of the department head which is accorded 
deference. In order to determine if that "decision" is entitled to 
deference, a hearing must be held to obtain facts and evidence 
sufficient to support the imposition of the agency head's discre-
tion in meting out discipline. 
Utah Admin. Code R137-20.C.2. (1993) provides exactly that. 
After the hearing officer determines through the evidentiary 
hearing he conducts that the allegations against the employee are 
supported by substantial evidence (credible, believable evidence), 
then "the CSRB hearing officer shall give deference to the decision 
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of the agency or the appointing authority" unless, as articulated 
by this court in Utah Dep't of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439 
(Utah App. 1991) , the imposition of the discipline was an abuse of 
discretion. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-203(4) specifically authorizes 
the CSRB to make rules governing "the use, calling, attendance, 
participation, and fees of witnesses in grievance proceedings;" 
(emphasis added). The above rule provides that after such an 
evidentiary hearing where the hearing officer makes findings of 
fact, deference will be given to the "decision" of the department 
head if that decision is supported by credible, believable 
evidence. 
Corrections is trying to confuse this court by dealing with 
semantics as to what the evidentiary hearing is. The CSRB and its 
predecessors have never given deference to the findings of fact of 
an agency. The hearings have always been a "new hearing." A new 
hearing is a new hearing - it is not the old hearing revisited. 
The new hearing is for the purpose of insuring that merit princi-
ples are protected and that the employee was dealt with appropri-
ately under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) which requires "cause" 
before termination or other discipline can be taken against the 
employee. To infer that the old rule somehow gives deference to 
the findings of fact is inaccurate and in error. Both the "old 
rule" and the "new rule" as referred to by Corrections give 
deference to the same thing - the "decision" of the agency. 
Contrary to Corrections' assertions, the rule change which it 
so strenuously objects to, did not institute a "bifurcated 
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approach." It was this court in Sucher and Despain that, clarified 
the process. As noted, this court overturned decisions of the CSRB 
by directing that the decision of whether a department head acted 
appropriately depends on two phases. The first phase deals with 
there being sufficient facts as determined by the substantial 
evidence standard to support the decision. Once the hearing 
officer determines the facts to be supportive in that manner, the 
hearing officer and hence the CSRB itself must sustain the decision 
if the decision is not an abuse of discretion. See; In re: 
Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1986), which was argued by 
Corrections in those cases and on which this court relied for 
direction. 
Corrections attempts to misconstrue the clear language of the 
CSRB's statutory authority by asserting that its right to hold de 
novo hearings and create a record independent from the agency to 
insure that "cause" as is required by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) 
(1993) should be disregarded. This is clearly an attempt by 
Corrections to have this court "judicially legislate" a change 
which never has existed and is clearly not provided in the statute. 
To do so would nullify the CSRB's statutory purpose and provide no 
independent evidentiary review of actions taken against employees. 
The CSRB points out that Corrections has been the subject of 
numerous de novo evidentiary hearings before the PRB and the CSRB 
hearing officers since 1979. In fact, the first evidentiary 
hearing before the newly appointed hearing officers under Utah Code 
Ann. 67-19-25(5) was a Corrections hearing. It was entitled Jerry 
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Fisher v. Adult Probation and Parole. 1 PRB/H.O. 1 (1979). Mr. 
Fisher was terminated for misconduct. The hearing officer upheld 
the dismissal after conducting an evidentiary review and issuing 
findings of fact. A copy of that decision is attached to this 
brief as Addendum F. 
Since 1979, approximately 185 decisions have been issued by 
hearing officers - all of which were based on evidentiary and de 
novo hearings processes. Hearing officers uniformly created a 
separate record from the evidence presented at their hearings and 
issued independent findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
decisions. Of the approximate 185 hearing officer decisions, 
Corrections has been a party to and involved in approximately 34 of 
the evidentiary hearings. 
The CSRB recognizes that the failure of a party to object to 
procedures used in previous hearings does not waive the right of 
the party to raise the issue in subsequent hearings. As such, the 
fact that Corrections has been involved with this process for so 
long does not preclude the issue being raised here. However, it is 
unfair and improper to assert that hearing officers have given 
deference to the findings of fact of the agencies and that holding 
the hearings as described above is beyond the authority of the 
CSRB. The CSRB urges this court to reject the argument as being 
without merit. 
POINT II 
THE HEARING HELD BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CORREC-
TIONS IS NOT SUBJECT TO UAPA, IS NOT PART OF 
THE GRIEVANCE PROCESS, AND IS SIMPLY A CONTIN-
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UATION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS FROM WHICH 
A RECOMMENDATION IS MADE TO THE EXECUTIVE* 
DIRECTOR AS TO WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN 
CONDUCT THAT WOULD JUSTIFY ACTION. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) sets forth the procedures which 
must be followed in order to dismiss a career service employee. 
Corrections asserts that because it holds an evidentiary hearing, 
the CSRB must give deference to its findings. Yet, the hearing 
held is based on allegations of wrongdoing, is not part of the 
grievance process, and is in essence a continuation of the 
investigative or fact finding process. None of the provisions of 
section 18(5) are implemented until well after this "hearing" is 
concluded. The hearing becomes a partner with the complaint in 
that it gives an opportunity to the employee to officially respond 
to the charges before the charges are forwarded to the executive 
director. 
As stated in Point I, above, there are twenty some departments 
in state government. Out of all the departments, Corrections is 
the only department which conducts its procedures in the manner 
presented to this court. The CSRB is aware of only two other 
departments that regularly hold evidentiary hearings. 
The Department of Human Services (DHS) holds a hearing after 
a notice of intent to discipline is given the employee. DHS's 
hearing constitutes the hearing before the department head on 
appeal of the proposed action. That is the hearing opportunity 
provided an employee under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) (d) . A tape 
recording is made which constitutes the record of that hearing. 
Yet, the holding of such evidentiary hearings is discretionary with 
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the department head and there have been numerous occasions when 
informal meetings with the department head have sufficed. 
The Department of Public Safety, on the other hand, conducts 
an evidentiary hearing but does not record the proceedings and 
hence does not retain any record of the testimony given. On 
occasion, such hearings are part of the process to determine 
whether the department head should give notice of discipline and on 
other occasions they constitute the department level hearing in the 
grievance process. From time to time, other departments hold 
informal evidentiary hearings, but not on a regular basis. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-30(2), grievances of 
dismissals are subject to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) and are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. In 
essence, when the dismissal takes place, it becomes part of the 
formal procedures and protections of UAPA and the right to formal 
evidentiary hearings is provided. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 sets 
forth the procedures of formal evidentiary hearings which allows 
for de novo hearings. 
As permitted by statute, the CSRB, as an administrative 
agency, has modified the procedures to meet the special needs in 
its hearings. Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-30(5) makes the grievance a 
request for agency action from which appeal is taken. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. hearings process goes through 
the CSRB which then renders a decision based on the protections of 
UAPA. 
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There are no formal adjudications under UAPA of charges 
brought against employees at the department level. The CSRB, 
however, pursuant to UAPA has declared that "For purposes of 
Section 63-46b-4 of the Administrative Procedures Act, all 
Adjudicative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board are to 
be construed as formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Admin. Code 
R137-1-17.B. (1992). As such, employees have no formal adjudica-
tions until they appeal to the CSRB under Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-
30(2) and 67-19a-406. 
The hearings and proceedings at the department level under 
Utah Code Ann. §67-19-18(5) are before the dismissal or disciplin-
ary action takes place. These are internal in nature and not 
subject to UAPA. Until the discipline is imposed, there is no 
grievable event from which an appeal can be taken (See: Tavlor v. 
Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432 (Utah App. 1989). 
UAPA specifically excludes internal matters from the protec-
tions and provisions of that law at Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(2) (e) 
wherein "internal personnel actions within an agency concerning its 
own employees, or judicial review of those actions" are listed. 
The CSRB statute at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(1)(a) lists those 
matters which may then become subject to UAPA through appeal to the 
Board. Dismissal is listed as one of those actions. Hence, once 
dismissal is imposed, then and only then is the action subject to 
UAPA i£ the employee appeals to the CSRB. If an employee chooses 
not to appeal, the decision of termination remains an internal 
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personnel action and is not subject to the heightened scrutiny of 
the formal processes under UAPA. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) lists the procedures necessary to 
terminate an employee. Therein is listed: 
(b) The department head or designated 
representative notifies the employee in writ-
ing of the reasons for the dismissal or demo-
tion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five 
working days to reply and have the reply 
considered by the department head. 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to 
be heard by the department head or designated 
representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee 
may be dismissed or demoted if the department 
head finds adequate cause or reason (emphasis 
added). 
Emphasized above is the fact that the grievance process 
doesn't begin until the employee has been "notified" in writing as 
to the reasons for the dismissal. Then, after that notice is 
given, he has an opportunity to have a hearing before the executive 
director or his designee. Only after that appeal hearing can the 
executive director dismiss the employee if he finds adequate cause. 
As will be shown, the procedure used in Corrections takes place 
before notice is ever given to the employee and is therefore not a 
part of the appeal hearing to the executive director. 
Each department handles disciplinary matters differently. The 
United States Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill. 
470 U.S. 532 (1985), held that pre-termination hearings are 
required as part of a government career service system to comply 
with the constitutional provision that property interests cannot be 
taken without "due process" of law. The Court held, however, that 
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formality is not necessary. All that is required is that the 
employee be given notice of the charges against him and be given an 
opportunity to respond. In essence, as long as an employee is 
notified as to the reasons and is given an opportunity to meet with 
the employer before termination is imposed, pre-termination due 
process is met. That is consistent with the provisions of Utah law 
cited above. 
Granted, Corrections has chosen to be more formal in the pre-
notification stages in hopes of clearly identifying to the employee 
what the allegations are for which he is charged. The CSRB takes 
no position as to how a department develops its case or determines 
whether to give notice of pending discipline. A department should 
not, however, have the authority to nullify the CSRB's statutory 
responsibility and authority to conduct independent reviews of what 
agencies do simply because an agency wants to be more formal in its 
"informal" stage. This would require legislative action in 
changing the statute. This appeal is not the proper place to 
address that issue. 
Simply because a department chooses to do more than is 
required by statute or court decision should not nullify the 
statutorily established procedures and obligations of the CSRB. 
Over the years, Counsel for the CSRB has represented Corrections in 
various matters in the personnel area. It didn't always hold 
formalized fact finding hearings. On many occasions, a simple 
meeting was held with the executive director. Nothing in Correc-
tions' statutes or the CSRB statutes require that Corrections do 
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what it does. Tomorrow, Corrections could revert to simple 
meetings with the executive director as its department level 
hearing without any formalized hearings as precursors. The 
documents included in this case by Corrections show that the 
department level hearing is in deed an informal discussion. 
The hearings currently held at Corrections - this case in 
particular - are not even a part of the grievance process as is 
provided for in Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-18 or 67-19a-l et. seq. 
This entire matter began with the Inspector General's Office of the 
Department issuing what has been termed an "Administrative 
Complaint" (Addendum A to Corrections Reply Brief, R.267-270) . The 
document simply notifies Hummel that he has been charged with 
violating policies. There is no indication that any action is 
being taken against him. In fact, at this point, no action is 
contemplated or taken and he is not notified that adverse action 
will be taken against him. 
Hummel is not given an opportunity to appeal to the executive 
director in this complaint because there is nothing to appeal - it 
is simply allegations against him. Instead, Hummel is ordered to 
appear before the Administrative Law Judge. His failure to appear 
for this hearing would be considered "in subordination" [sic]. In 
essence, his appearance is a forced appearance to answer to charges 
against him. It is in essence a "fact finding" procedure to 
determine what the department believes the facts are and how Hummel 
responds to them. All of this is done before any personnel action 
is taken. 
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At this point, the Administrative Law Judge is not governed by 
UAPA. As such, the protections of UAPA do not apply. The ALJ is 
also not the designee of the Department head pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-18(5) since there has been no notification in writing 
as to any disciplinary action contemplated against him. 
Through this "fact finding hearing," the ALJ would be in a 
better position to "counsel" the executive director as to whether 
he believes an employee has violated any policies and if so, 
whether he believes disciplinary action should be contemplated. If 
the charges were determined to be unfounded, it can only be assumed 
that the matter would end and no letter of disciplinary action 
would be sent to the employee. 
Agency Exhibit 18 (Addendum B, Corrections Addendums, R.27-
1281) makes it clear that this hearing was simply a fact finding 
hearing as the CSRB alleges. Granted, the ALJ determined that from 
what came before him the matter justified disciplinary action. He 
suggested at R.281 that the sanction could be between 30 days off 
without pay up to termination. Still, at the time of this Report 
and Recommendation, Hummel had never been notified that any action 
would be taken against him. 
Agency Exhibit 19 (Corrections Addendum C, R.282-83) clearly 
sets forth what happened after the ALJ issued his Report and 
Recommendation on May 10, 1991. It was not until May 14, 1991, 
that Hummel was given a written notice of the recommended termina-
tion. Thereafter, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18 (5) (d) , 
Hummel was given an opportunity to meet with the executive 
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director's designee in a pre-termination hearing on May 23, 1991. 
This was an informal meeting without evidence being taken or 
testimony given. It was a meeting between Mr. David Franchina and 
Mr. Hummel. 
The CSRB concedes that the Mr. Franchina relied on the Report 
and Recommendation of the ALJ in his discussion with Hummel, but 
regardless of how formal the fact finding hearing was, it was not 
handled as part of the appeals process but was simply a part of the 
investigative process, though more formal it was. 
This investigative process utilized by Corrections is based 
upon a statutory delegation of authority at Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-
28(1). Therein, Corrections' "administrative hearings office" may 
consider or review "issues involving staff" and "any other 
administrative matters as assigned by the executive director." In 
conducting such departmental hearings on "issues involving staff," 
Corrections' "hearing officer" is to maintain only a "summary 
record of all hearings - but not an "official record of the 
proceeding" as is required by the CSRB's hearing officer (Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-406(1)(b)). In sum, these departmental investigative 
hearings are not formal adjudications of complaints under UAPA. 
Hummel, pursuant to Loudermill, was given an opportunity to 
informally meet with the designee of the executive director. It 
was the Final Order "89 GWD 39" (R.282-3) which was the notifica-
tion under Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) (e) that the termination was 
upheld. Thereafter a grievable event took place where the employee 
27 
could appeal that decision to the CSRB and be subject to the 
protections of UAPA and the grievance statute and rules. 
Under UAPA, everything at the department level regarding 
personnel issues is exempt from UAPA and is thus informal. 
Evidence and possibly the transcript of the department level 
hearing can be introduced into evidence, but until a situation 
makes it to the CSRB processes, a reviewing agency would not have 
the obligation to hold an evidentiary hearing. 
Corrections is attempting to have this court judicially 
legislate that its internal investigative and fact finding 
procedures are part of the state employment grievance process. 
That is simply not true. There is no justification for so 
declaring. Until the ALJ determines what he will believe as fact 
in making a recommendation to the executive director and further, 
until action is taken based on that recommendation, there is no 
formalized notice to the employee regarding what sanction he is 
defending himself against. 
Even with the facts the way they are, an employee still has an 
opportunity to attack the entire process including the imposition 
of discipline. There was never a formalized hearing process to 
discuss the ultimate sanction. Mr. Franchina's Final Order makes 
clear that it was an informal discussion. 
Any career employee, under the provisions of the Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. has the 
right to have a formal hearing before the CSRB and require his or 
her department to establish both sufficient credible facts to 
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justify the allegations as well as the ultimate decision. Then, as 
pointed out in the prior argument, if the agency can establish that 
substantial evidence exists to support the allegations, the hearing 
officer and the CSRB will give deference to the agency's decision 
unless the decision was an abuse of discretion. 
POINT III 
THE DE NOVO EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS PROVIDE THAT 
A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT DECISION WILL BE 
MADE ON THE EVIDENCE THAT IS ADMITTED IN THE 
HEARING AND CHANGES IN EVIDENCE DO NOT MANDATE 
THAT THE MATTER BE SENT BACK TO THE DEPART-
MENT. 
As has been shown in the above points, the statutory authority 
to hold evidentiary hearings is clear and unambiguous. The 
decisions from these "new hearings" are based on the evidence that 
is presented at the hearings themselves and not from other 
hearings. If a party believes something that was introduced or 
said at a prior hearing was important to the new hearing, then that 
party can present it in the new hearing or present testimony of 
what had happened. 
Counsel for the Board has personally been a part of hearings 
where tapes of prior department level hearings were introduced into 
evidence and the hearing officers have relied on what was said in 
those hearings as it was a part of the new hearing. The parties 
have the right and authority to make their cases within reason and 
within broad standards of relevance and credibility. 
Now, Corrections has argued that a "change of circumstances" 
necessitates the remand of the matter to the Department. Once the 
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matter is properly before the CSRB, the parties arfe free to 
introduce new evidence, ask different questions, do formal 
discovery, and in essence present a new case with even new twists 
and emphasis than was done before. 
Because the hearings before the CSRB are formal under UAPA, 
there is a heightened independence and formality in the review 
process separate and apart from what an agency allows or does 
internally. The CSRB asserts that it is an inherent "given" that 
de novo hearings always have the potential for "changed" testimony, 
changed evidence - in essence, changed circumstances. 
The Board finds Correction's argument regarding remand based 
on changed circumstances and certain language in the interim 
decision of this court wherein the CSRB was ordered to appear 
troubling at best and disturbing at most. It is the CSRB that 
conducts independent evidentiary hearings based on evidence 
existent at the time of the hearing. All changed circumstances 
which the parties desire to present to the hearing officer are 
presented and taken into consideration as part of the "new 
hearing." 
Through its argument (which piggy backs on the proposition 
that the CSRB has no authority to find facts) , Corrections is 
advocating that the CSRB ignore its directive to hold de novo 
evidentiary hearings and any time a change of circumstances from 
that which was presented at the department level is detected, a 
remand is required. That is not the statutory process. Once the 
decision is made by the executive director, the employee has the 
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right to appeal to the CSRB which then takes jurisdiction of the 
appeal and renders a decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l 
et. seq. 
Without belaboring the point, it is quite clear that when de 
novo hearings are held, new evidence can be introduced, different 
questions asked, cross examination conducted which was not done 
before, new rebuttal evidence submitted, etc. Indeed, Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-18(5} only requires that an employee be given an 
opportunity to have a hearing with the department head. It does 
not compel attendance. 
Hence, if a notice of intent to discipline is given to an 
employee and the employee waives his right to meet with the 
department head or his designee, that permits the department head 
to make a decision as to discipline without input from the 
employee. After the letter of termination is given and the 
termination becomes effective, for example, the employee has 20 
working days within which to appeal to the CSRB for a "new 
hearing." See: Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(5). 
As a result, the employee would not be prohibited from 
presenting evidence or defenses at the CSRB hearing which was not 
known by the department head or "changes the circumstances." The 
CSRB maintains that it is not obligated to send a matter back, 
either sua sponte or at a party's request just because a party 
believes that a new "twist" or new information has been uncovered 
in the hearing officer's hearing. That happens all of the time. 
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In Mr. Hummel's case, the CSRB acted well within its discretion 
when it did not grant the department's request for a remand. 
After a department head makes his decision, the CSRB reviews 
the ultimate decision and determines based on the facts presented 
at the evidentiary hearing (whether they remain the same are 
different, or are modified through the hearing process) whether 
that ultimate decision is within the discretion of the director or 
is an abuse of that discretion. Even if the testimony or facts 
change significantly, the responsibility is still with the CSRB to 
make that determination. 
As noted earlier, there is no formal hearing process under the 
protections of UAPA at Corrections' level as part of the employee 
grievance process. As such, there is no record to be reviewed per 
se because UAPA considers such matters "informal." Informal 
matters have the right to formal adjudications as de novo hearings. 
While Corrections maintains that its record is sufficient, as a 
matter of law, it is not. 
Those parts of the department level fact finding hearing which 
Corrections believed were relevant could have been introduced into 
evidence at the CSRB hearing. Had Corrections attempted to 
introduce relevant parts of its hearing or "record" and had the 
hearing officer refused to allow them in, then the proper argument 
would have been to raise the issue before the CSRB at the appellate 
level to determine if the hearing officer had committed error. 
That is what happens when this court reviews the evidentiary 
decisions of district courts. This court is well aware of numerous 
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instances where decisions of trial courts have been reversed 
because of errors in evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the recent case of Archer v. Board 
of State Lands and Forestry, Case No. 940214, Slip Opinion, October 
11, 1995, addresses de novo review of informal proceedings. The 
Court states at page 3 of the Slip Opinion: 
This section [§ 63-46b-15(l) (a)] requires that 
the district court's review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings be performed by holding a 
new trial rather than by reviewing the infor-
mal record. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 
449, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The State 
argues that where the governing statute grants 
discretion to an administrative agency, the 
standard of review in a trial de novo of an 
informal administrative proceeding should be 
limited to determining whether the agency's 
decision was reasonable in view of the facts 
presented at the district court. In other 
words, the State argues that the district 
court's de novo review of an informal proceed-
ing should defer to the reasonable exercise of 
statutorily delegated discretion to the Divi-
sion. We disagree. 
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the 
rule previously used in two decisions from the 
Utah Court of Appeals establishing the right 
to a new trial without deference to the deter-
minations of an informal administrative pro-
ceeding. ..review bv trial de novo means a new 
trial with no deference to the administrative 
proceedings below. 
Case No. 940214, Slip Opinion, October 11, 1995, p. 3 (emphasis 
added). 
Under UAPA, that which Corrections did is informal at best and 
therefore subject to a review by trial de novo at the CSRB level. 
The CSRB obviously recognizes differences between Archer and its 
statutory provisions and further understands the previous cases 
this Court has rendered in appeals from the CSRB. Yet, the 
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principle appears to be correct that a review by the CSRB in 
creating its own record is de novo and therefore the review of the 
agency decision will be made based on what is introduced at that 
hearing. 
In the Matter of Noren. 621 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1980), a pre-UAPA 
case, the Utah Supreme Court was faced with determining what effect 
the expungement of a criminal record had on an agency's decision 
when the expungement took place between the issuance of the agency 
decision and before the matter was heard in district court. The 
court rejected the argument that the agency decision be sustained 
simply based on what was before the agency. In essence, new 
evidence can be introduced in a de novo trial and if the new 
evidence points to a new conclusion, then the new conclusion should 
be implemented. As stated by the court: 
Appellant also argues that the District 
Court, in reviewing an administrative deci-
sion, may consider only whether appellant 
acted within his statutory powers or abused 
his discretion, and evidence which was not 
available to him cannot be considered. He 
contends the facts and the law must be applied 
as thev existed at the inception of the law-
suit, which was in this case, he asserts, the 
original application for license. 
621 P.2d at 1248 (emphasis added). Thereafter the court rejected 
this argument indicating that the appeal was really an original 
action and therefore the court could make the determination 
existing as of the date of the initiation of the action in district 
court and not as the agency had them. 
The CSRB understands that the appeal before it is not an 
"original action" as indicated in Noren. However, as in Noren the 
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court viewed the beginning of the action when the matter was filed 
in district court. In this case, the appeal to the CSRB is the 
beginning of the UAPA hearing process under the Grievance and 
Appeals Act, Since the CSRB has the right by statute to hold an 
evidentiary hearing in order to determine facts, the determination 
is made as to what the facts are at the time the matter was heard. 
A change of circumstances, such as happened in Noren, did not 
dictate a remand to the department. The CSRB has the authority to 
view the department head's decision in light of the evidence 
presented. 
Whether the CSRB correctly dealt with that evidence and the 
expungement - as it relates to the ultimate decision of the CSRB -
will not be argued by the Board. Corrections and Hummel have 
argued those subtleties and the CSRB will not spend its time 
justifying its decision in that regard. That is now properly 
before this Court to decide whether the CSRB ruled appropriately. 
Nonetheless, all evidence regarding the expungement was before the 
hearing officer and the hearing proceeded based on the evidence 
presented at the hearing officer hearing. The evidence presented 
by Corrections was not based on the "conviction" because at the 
time of the hearing there was no conviction. 
The CSRB, whose statutory authority it is to review the 
agency's action, can determine if the circumstances are so changed 
as to justify a change in discipline because it would constitute an 
abuse of discretion. Indeed, Corrections has argued in Point II-E 
that the hearing officer and the CSRB misapplied the evidence that 
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was presented in reaching their conclusion. That is an issue this 
Court must reach since the CSRB has already spoken. That, however, 
is an issue of law and does not demand that a remand be ordered in 
this case. If the CSRB was in error, the Court can correct that 
error. If the CSRB was correct, then the decision should be upheld 
because the change in circumstances justified a revision of the 
department's disciplinary penalty. 
In another "pre-UAPA" case, the Supreme Court held in 
University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 
1983) that: 
Thus, we viewed the district court as an 
independent fact finder and not as an interme-
diate appellate court. Similarly, in Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Confer. 61A P. 2d (Utah 
1983), we once again noted that the district 
court's role was one of fact finder and that 
it could affirm the findings of the Industrial 
Commission or make its own findings. We noted 
that the "entire case file before the commis-
sion" be filed with the district court permits 
the court to conduct its trial de novo by 
utilizing the record before the Commission. 
However, we observed that this "would not 
prevent the district court from adding to that 
record if it elected to do so." 
... The legislature clearly intended that the 
court be the fact finder on review. Thus, the 
findings of the Commission are superseded by 
the findings of the district court, and no 
particular deference need be given to the 
former. 
736 P.2d at 633 (emphasis added). 
While the Board recognizes that this case is not directly 
applicable, it believes the principle enunciated in the decision is 
proper and on point. The Board hearing officer is indeed a review-
ing officer to determine what facts are supported by credible 
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evidence at the time of the hearing and whether those facts support 
the decision made. 
While Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) establishes that it is the 
department head that determines whether there is cause to terminate 
an employee, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-l et. seq. also establishes 
that it is the CSRB that holds the evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the decision and 
whether the decision is an abuse of discretion. 
The CSRB finds it difficult to understand why there is now a 
contesting of the Board's jurisdiction when Hummel appealed pur-
suant to statute and statute confers jurisdiction on the CSRB. 
Every de novo evidentiary hearing is "different" from prior 
hearings. 
To follow Corrections' argument to its natural conclusion, 
would require the CSRB hearing officer to immediately remand any 
matter to the department head if he determined the facts were 
different at his hearing than those relied on by the department 
head. If the department head is in error as to what the facts are, 
then it is the CSRB that determines the validity of the facts, 
whether they are credible and how that affects the decision. 
Otherwise, this, flies counter to the very statutes establishing 
the CSRB. 
The Board and it's hearing officers are not only statutorily 
empowered to make the determinations, but they should not be 
belittled in their ability to act reasonably. Corrections makes it 
appear that such cannot possibly be the case, but refuses to 
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acknowledge that the Board and its hearing officers have ruled 
favorably in Corrections behalf on numerous occasions. 
This appellate process is a safeguard for career employees to 
insure that departments follow appropriate procedure and discipline 
employees only for cause. No judge, jury or board is insulated 
from making mistakes. The legal reporters are replete with 
thousands of cases where such entities made mistakes or applied the 
law improperly. 
If the CSRB or other agencies act contrary to law or apply it 
improperly, then it is the court's role to correct those errors. 
Remanding cases back to the agency when the CSRB has statutory 
authority to hear de novo hearings is not one of those errors that 
needs to be corrected because it is not error. As to the CSRB's 
application of the law to this case, that is a different issue. It 
is error for this court, however, to create restrictions and add 
procedural requirements which are not provided in statute. 
ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLICATION OF OPINION 
Oral argument is not requested because argument has already 
been conducted in this matter. The Court desired the CSRB to 
address issues of jurisdiction and procedure which it has done and 
unless the court desires oral response to concerns it has, the CSRB 
does not request oral argument. The CSRB does, however, believe 
that regardless of how the court rules on the merits of the appeal 
of Corrections, the issues raised and addressed by all parties, 
particularly regarding the CSRB's jurisdiction and procedure are 
significant and should be addressed formally in published form. 
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CONCLUSION 
The CSRB reiterates that it provides an unbiased fully 
independent and "unattached" review process. Employees may be 
dismissed for "just cause". The CSRB's role is to insure that the 
facts upon which discipline is based is valid and credible and that 
the discipline is within discretion and not an abuse. To this end, 
the Legislature has established the CSRB to be this independent 
agency. To hold that the CSRB may not engage in the actions it has 
taken and to agree with Correction's position is to judicially gut 
the strength and authority of the CSRB and place undue burdens on 
this independent review. Such a position is unreasonable, 
unworkable, contrary to existing statute and improper. 
The de novo nature of fact gathering naturally includes the 
adding of information in the new hearing which might not have been 
available or might have changed the circumstances on which the 
department head acted. This does not necessitate a remand to the 
department. The CSRB is established to review such matters. It 
places an unworkable burden on the CSRB and its hearing officers to 
determine what is a "substantial," "significant" or "material" 
change which would necessitate a remand to the department head. 
Corrections' argument should be rejected and the CSRB allowed to 
deal with changes as they come forth in hearings. 
DATED this <3$ day of October, 1995. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for the CSRB 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-13-14 (1969) 
MERIT SYSTEMS •67-13-2 
range for the payment of such compensation and expenses. Nothing 
contained in this section shall be construed to relieve the state or the po-
litical subdivision thereof in which such property or any part thereof is 
situated from its duty to furnish for such property or part thereof such 
normal police protection as it ordinarily and customarily provides for 
other property situated therein. 
History: L. 1941 (2nd 8. S.), ck 55, § 10; to this end the provisions of this aet are 
C. 1943, 82B-0-19. declared to be severable/' 
Separability Clause. Repealing Clause. 
Section 11 of Laws 1941 (2nd 8. 8.), ch. Section 12 of Laws 1941 (2nd S. 8.), 
35 (Code 1943, 82B-0-20) provided: "If ch. 35 (Code 1943, 82B-0-21) provided that 
any provision of this aet or the applica- all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with 
tion thereof to any person or circumstances the provisions of this act and not express-
is held invalid, such invalidity shall not ly repealed herein are repealed, 
affect other provisions or applications of 
the act which can be given effect without Collateral References, 
the invalid provision or application, and StatesC=>57. 
61 CJ.8. States § 49. 
CHAPTER 13 
MERIT SYSTEMS 
Section 67-13-1. Eepealed. 
67-13-2. Establishment of state system—Purpose of act—Principles rec-
ognized. 
67-13-3. Governor's authority and responsibility—Appointment and duties of 
state director of personnel—Merit system director—Appointment, 
organization and duties of merit system council. 
67-13-4. Bules and regulations for personnel administration—Promulgation 
of—Term of present program. 
67-13-5. Division of responsibilities between personnel office and line agencies. 
67-13-6. Positions exempt from merit provisions—Schedules of civil serv-
ice—Allocation of positions—Bequests to change schedule assign-
ment—"Merit system" and "classified civil service" denned. 
67-13-7. Personnel with service prior to effective date—Provisions for re-
tention in state service. 
67-13-8. Employee accepting appointment to exempt position after effective 
date—Beappointment register. 
67-13-9. Payrolls examined by director—Certification of employees by direc-
tor for hiring, change in pay or status and for pay. 
67-13-10. Use of buildings of state, municipalities and political subdivisions 
by state personnel office—State unitB to appropriate funds. 
67-13-11. Appointments from registers—Examinations—Certification of appli-
cants—Probationary period required—Tenure. 
67-13-12. Classification of positions—Appeals—Pay plan. 
67-13-13. Political activities of employees—Provisions of rules limiting ac-
tivities^—Hatch Act not affected. 
67-13-14. Dismissals—Appeals—Be duct ions in work force. 
67-13-15. Separability provisions—Conformity of rules and regulations with 
federal provisions. 
67-13-1. Eepealed. 
Repeal game department and recreation eommis-
Section 67-13-1 (L. 1959, ch. 74, § 1), ***, was repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 131, 
relating to merit systems in the fish and 1 1 7* 
67-13-2. Establishment of state system—Purpose of act—Principles 
recognized.—(a) The general purpose of this act is to establish for the 
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67-13-13. Political activities of employees—Provisions of rules limit-
ing activities—Hatch Act not affected.—Except as otherwise provided by 
law or by rules and regulations promulgated- hereunder for federally 
aided programs, the following provisions shall apply with regard to politi-
cal activity of employees for all grades and positions in the merit system: 
(a) The state director of personnel shall promulgate rules, subject to 
the approval of the governor, to provide for limitations upon the political 
activities of state officers or employees covered by the merit system. These 
rules shall be drafted and interpreted to protect the officer or employee 
from political exploitation or abuse and to allow individual state officers 
and employees the broadest amount of personal political participation con-
sistent with loyal service to their superiors in state government. 
The rules shall incorporate, among others, the following provisions: 
(1) No officer or employee covered by the merit system while in a pay 
status shall be a state or federal officer in any political party organization, 
or in any state-wide political campaign. Such officer or employee may be an 
officer or a delegate in a political party organization at a county or in-
ferior level or a delegate at a state or national level. 
(2) No officer or employee covered by the merit system shall be a 
candidate for any political office, provided that upon proper application, 
an officer or employee may be granted leave of absence, without loss of 
existing seniority or tenure to participate in a political campaign, either 
as an officer or as a candidate; however, time spent during such political 
leave shall not be counted for seniority purposes as being in service. 
(3) No officer or employee covered by the merit system may engage 
in any political activity during the hours of employment, nor shall any 
person solicit political contributions from employees of the executive 
branch during hours of employment or through state facilities or in any 
manner impose assessments on state employees for political purposes; but 
nothing in this section shall preclude voluntary contributions by a state 
employee to the party of his choice. 
(4) Partisan political activity shall not be a basis for employment, 
promotion, demotion or dismissal, except that the state director of person-
nel shall promulgate rules subject to the approval of the governor provid-
ing for the discipline or punishment of a state officer or employee who 
violates any provision of this section. 
(b) Nothing contained herein shall be construed to permit partisan 
political activity of any state employee who is prevented or restricted from 
engaging in such political activity by the provisions of the federal Hatch 
Act. 
History: L. 1965, CIL 131, § 12. Compiler's Notes. 
The Hatch Aet, referred to in tubsec (b), is compiled at 7 UJ3.C. {§ S61a-361i. 
67-13-14. Dismissals—Appeals—Reductions in work force.—-(a) Dis-
missals from positions under the merit system shall only be to advance the 
good of the public service, where funds have expired or work no longer 
exists, or for such causes as inefficiency, insubordination, disloyalty to the 
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. 
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67-13-14 STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
There shall be no dismissal for reasons of race, national origin, religion or 
political affiliation from the merit system. 
(b) In any appeal from a charge of inefficiency, where the charge is 
supported by credible evidence, there shall be a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of the administrative officer, with the burden of proof resting upon 
the employee bringing the appeal. 
(c) Except in aggravated cases of misconduct, no person shall be 
demoted or dismissed from a tenured position without the following pro-
cedures : 
(1) Notification in writing by the department head of the reasons for 
discharge. 
(2) The employee shall have an opportunity to reply and have his 
reply considered by his department head. 
(3) An opportunity to be heard by his department head or designated 
representatives. 
(4) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or de-
moted if the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(5) If the department head finds that retention of any employee would 
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the pub-
lic interest, such employee may be summarily suspended pending adminis-
trative hearings and merit system council review. 
(d) An employee who is aggrieved by a decision of his department 
head may appeal the decision to the merit system council which shall set 
a time and date for hearing of the appeal, and the employee shall have 
a right to appear in person or by counsel. The decision of the merit system 
council shall be final and there shall be no access to the courts. 
(e) Disciplinary actions shall be supported by credible evidence, but 
the normal rules of evidence in courts of law shall not apply in hearings 
before the department head or merit system council. 
(f) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of 
workload, or lack of work shall be governed by retention rosters to be 
established by the state director of personnel. Under such circumstances: 
(1) The department head shall designate the category of work to be 
eliminated, subject to review by the state director of personnel. 
(2) Temporary and probationary workers shall be separated before 
any tenured employee. 
(3) Retention points for each tenured employee shall be computed, 
allowing fifty per cent weight for his proficiency and fifty per cent weight 
for his seniority in state government, including any military service ful-
filled subsequent to original state appointment. Tenured employees shall 
be separated in the order of their retention points, the employee with the 
lowest points to be discharged first. 
(4) Tenured employees who are separated in reductions in force shall 
be placed on the reappointment register (provided for in section 67-13-
8(a)(2)) and shall be reappointed without examination to any vacancies 
for which they are qualified which occur within one year of the date of their 
separation. 
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History: L. 1965, ch. 131, § 13. Collateral Eeferenccs. 
Pre-employment conduct as ground for 
discharge of civil service employee having 
permanent status, 4 A. L. E. 3d 468. 
67-13-15. Separability provisions—Conformity of rules and regula-
tions with federal provisions.—(a) If any provision of this law or of any 
regulation or order thereunder or the application of such provision to any 
person or circumstance shall be held invalid, the remainder of this law and 
the application of such provision of this law or of such regulation or or-
der to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid 
shall still be regarded as having the force and effect of law. 
(b) If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal 
requirements which are a condition precedent to the allocation of federal 
funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is hereby declared to be 
inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the 
agencies directly affected, and such findings shall not affect the operation 
of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned. 
(c) Notwithstanding any provisions in this law to the contrary, no 
regulation shall be adopted which would deprive the state of Utah or any 
of its departments or institutions of federal grants or other forms of 
financial assistance, and the rules and regulations promulgated hereun-
der shall include standards, provisions, terms and conditions for personnel 
engaged in the administration of federally aided programs, which shall, in 
all respects, comply with the necessary requirements for a qualified merit 
system under the standards applicable to personnel engaged in the ad-
ministration of federally aided programs, including but not limited to the 
following federal laws: 
Social Security Act, Titles I (old-age assistance and medical assistance 
for the aged), HI (unemployment compensation), IV (aid and services 
to needy families with children), V (maternal and child welfare), X (aid to 
the blind), XIV (aid to the permanently and totally disabled), and XVI 
(aid to the aged, blind, or disabled, or for such aid and medical assistance 
to the aged); the Public Health Service Act, including the Hospital Sur-
vey and Construction Act; the Wagner-Peyser Act, as amended; the Fed-
eral Civil Defense Act, as amended; the Economic Opportunity Act of 
1964; and the Federal Interstate Highway Act. 
History: I* 1965, CIL 131, § 14. The Wagner-Peyser Act, aa amended, 1B 
, _, ^ compiled at 29 UJ3.C. §§ 49-49k and 89 
Compiler's Notes. TJJ3.C. §838. 
The Social Security Act, Title I, re- The Federal Civil Defense Act is com-
ferred to in this section, is compiled at piled at 50 Appx. §§2251 et seq. 
42 UJ3.C. §§ 301 et seq; Title HI, at 42 The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq; Title IV, at 42 U.S.C. is compiled at 42 UJ3.C. §§ 2701 et seq. 
§§ 601 et seq; Title V, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701 The Federal Interstate Highway Act 
et seq; Title X, at 42 TLS.C. §§ 1201 et is compiled at 23 U-S.C. §§ 104 et seq. 
seq; Title XIV, at 42 UJ3.C. §§ 1351 et Laws 1965, ch. 131, § 15, amended sec-
seq; Title XVI, at 42 TJJ3.C. §§ 1381 et seq; tions 26-15-5 and 26-15-6. Section 16 was 
The Public Health Sendee Act is com- omitted from the 1965 act and section 17, 
piled at 42 UJS.C. §§ 201 et seq. a repealing clause, is set out under section 
The Hospital Survey and Construction 26*15-6. 
Act is compiled at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291m. 
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ADDENDUM B 
ARTICLE III - APPEALS 
Rules of the Merit System Council, August 28, 1974 
State of Utah 
MERIT SYSTEM 
PROCEDURE: 
Adopted By The State Personnel Director 
And 
The Utah State Merit System Council 
As Amended August 28, L974 
Issued by the 
PERSONNEL DIVISION 
of the 
Depar tment of Finance 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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ARTlClfe III - APPEALS 
Section 1. Hearings by the Mei i t System Council - - Examinations and Registers 
Paragraph 1. Upon receipt of a written request for a hearing by the 
Council in matters pertaining to the establishment and maintenance of r e g i s -
t ers or other operation of the Merit System within an agency, an appeal from 
examination rejection or examination rating, or removal from the register^ 
the Council shall make a review and submit its decision in writing to the person 
making the appeal and to the "ag^mry?— :s*-s^i. 
Section 2. Hearings by the M^rit System Council - Discrimination, D i smis sa l , 
Suspension, Demotion, Reassignment or Separation Due to a 
Reduct ion of Force 
Paragraph 1. Procedure* Prior to Hearings 
a. Upon r^ceip- of notice of appeal from discrimination, d i smissa l s 
suspension, demotion, reassignment, or separation due to r e d u c t i o n s ! 
force from an employes, the Merit System Director shall notify the jn tgr -
estefl agency of the notice no later than three workdays after receipt of 
the notice. ~ 
b. The appellant shall include in his appeal a short statement which 
may include statements of-denial of charges, mitigation, extenuating c ircum-
stances, or such other information, statements, or c laims as may lend 
support to his appeal. He shall advise the Merit System Director of any 
witnesses whom he expects to introduce at the hearing in support of his 
appeal, and whether he intends to present his case personally or through... 
a representative. The appellant shall be responsible for notifying such wit-
nes se s of the t ime and pl&ce ox^thenKea"ririgI " •-—-
* _ 
c. Within three workdays after the receipt of the appeal, the Merit 
System Director- shall-tranfi'nnitjtcLiJie interested a g e n c i e s ^ copy of^the 
statement. 
d. Within three workdays after the receipt of the appeal, the agency 
shall transmit to the Merit System Director a statement of the cause of the 
action which has been appealed. This statement should be short, but in 
sufficient detail as to present al l of the pertinent facts. Within this period 
the agency shall also advise the Merit System Director of any wi tnesses it 
expects to introduce at the hearing in support of its action, The-agency 
shall be responsible for notifying such witnesses of the t ime and place of 
the hearing, ' — — 
e. At least 4 workdays in advance of the hearing, the Merit System 
Director shall: 
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(1) Notify the appellant and the agency by t e l e p h o n £ j ) £ b y m a i l 
of the t i m e and' place the hearing; isTto" be'heldT 
(2) Furnish each member of the Council with the agency's reasons 
for i t s 'ac t ions /and a copy of the appellant's letter appealing such actions.:. 
Paragraph 2. Procedure at the Hearings - Introductory Statement - - The 
following procedure is intended to be a guide for the conduct of the hearing in an 
orderly manner. It is not fixed in the sense that it will be allowed to interfere 
with the purpose of the hearing - to bring out all the facts. The appellant may 
present his case personally or through a representative of his choice. The 
hearing shall not be bound either by legal procedures or by legal rules of ev i -
dence. A verbatim record shall be kept of the proceedings. Reference to the 
hearing and the Council's decision and recommendations shall be entered in the 
minutes of the next Council meeting. 
a. The Council Chairman shall open the hearing by naming the 
parties and stating the nature of the action of the agency. 
b. Presentation of the agency's case . 
(1) When requested by the chairman, the agency representa-
t ive shall read the agency's letter to the employee. Upon completion 
of the reading, the agency representative may make such other oral 
statements or offer such other evidence as he may consider necessary 
to supplement the statement. 
(2) When the agency representative has finished with his oral 
statements or has stated that he has none to make, he may introduce 
wi tnesses or material evidence in support- of the agency's action. 
(3) . At the c lose of the agency representative's oral statements 
and the test imony or evidence offered by agency wi tnesses , questions 
may be directed to the representative and each witness by interested 
parties. Interested Parties are as follows, and they shall raise 
questions in the order named and at t imes called upon by the chairman, 
(a) The agency representative, on the test imony and 
evidence of agency wi tnesses ; and agency wi tnesses , on the 
test imony and evidence of the representative and of each other 
witne s s. 
(b) The appellant, on the testimony and evidence offered 
by the agency representative and each agency witness . Questions 
of the appeallant at this point should be aimed at focusing the 
attention of the Council on what he considers to be weaknesses of 
the agency's position or on points that he wil l make later when 
presenting his case . THIS IS NOT THE PROPER PLACE FOR 
PTTT^TTTTAT O P r r m N T ^13 A R G U M E N T S . 
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(c) The Merit System Director, on the test imony and evi-
dence of the agency representative and each agency wi tness , 
(d) Council, on the testimony of and evidence offered by 
the agency representative and each witness , 
(4) Prior to closing the presentation of the agency's c a s e , the 
Council shall call for questions or statements by any interested parties 
concerning the case of the agency. (Note: The purpose of this step is 
to allow presentation of testimony or evidence not previously presented 
in the foregoing procedure. ) 
c. Presentation of the appellant's case - - The procedure here shall 
be exactly the same as that for presentationof the case of the agency except 
that the roles of the agency representative and witnesses and those of the 
appellant and his wi tnesses shall be reversed. 
d. Before closing the case , the Council shall allow the appellant 
and agency representative in turn to make closing statements. 
Paragraph 3. The Council shall make a written summary of the hearing 
and prepare its decis ion and recommendations, all of which shall be submitted 
to the interested parties. Such decision shall be made within 10 days after the 
date of the hearing. Decis ion of the Council shall be final. 
ARTICLE IV - APPOINTMENTS 
Section 1. F o r m UP 31 - Request for Certification of El igibles 
(See instructions on Form) 
Section 2. F o r m UP 32 - Inquiry Regarding Availability for Appointment 
(See instructions on Form) 
Section 3, F o r m UP 33 - Notice of Personnel Action 
(See instructions on Form) 
Section 4. 
Paragraph 1. 'Persons who fail to appear for interview, fail to answer an 
availability notice or fail to give adequate information requested in writing may 
be considered as not available in any position, in any county or at any salary. 
Section 5. Payrol l Exceptions 
Paragraph 1. The Merit System Director shall take exception to payroll 
ADDENDUM C 
In the Matter of the Appeal of Stanley J. Konkol 
MSC 78-5 (1978) 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL 
In the Matter of the ) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONSLUSIONS 
Appeal of ) OF LAW AND DECISION 
STANLEY J. KONKOL ) M S C - "7J$? ~*$ 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the above 
entitled Council on the 30th day of March, 1978, pursuant to the 
appeal of Stanley J. Konkol (hereinafter "Appellant") from his dis-
missal from the State Youth Development Center (hereinafter "Agency"). 
Appellant was present and was represented by his counsel, Randall R. 
Smart. The Agency was represented by Dennis Ritz, Tommy Smith and 
counsel, Stephen G. Schwendiman of the Attorney General's office. 
Council members Anthony L. Rampton, Mrs. 0. N. Malmquist, Orlando 
A. Riveria, Howard W. Knight and Mrs. Marguerite Horton were present. 
Oral testimony and documentary evidence were presented to 
the Council and the Council being duly advised in the premises makes 
and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Appellant during all times material hereto was 
employed by the Agency as a Security Officer/Security Driver. 
2. In such capacity Appellant is charged, among others, 
with the following duties and responsibilities: 
(a) He must be mentally alert at all times to security 
problems. 
(b) He must be able to chase, apprehend, and hold 
attempted AWOLs. 
(c) He must give support and backup in every situation 
where there is a problem and an emergency call goes out. 
(d) He must be ready, willing and able to give sup-
port to any staff member that may call for assistance in handling 
emergency problems (disciplinary, assaultive, attempts to escape, 
riots, or any other disruptive problems), and 
(e) He must give loyalty in support to other members 
of the security force. 
3. During the week of October 17, 1977, Appellant was found 
asleep in his car while on duty. 
4. Appellant removed and destroyed official papers from 
the desk of Mr. Horace Hood, Chief Security Officer, which were pre-
pared for the purpose of discussing with Appellant certain ineffic-
iencies in his performance as a Security Officer. 
5. On January 6, 1978, Appellant allowed students to es-
cape by not intervening to stop students who were attempting to 
escape and failed to pursue the students following their escape. 
6. On January 6, 1978, Appellant failed to assist and give 
support to other staff members during a disturbance in the cafeteria. 
7. On January 27, 1978, Appellant was informed in writing 
by the Agency of the aforementioned deficiencies in his performance 
and asked to give reasons why he should not be terminated. 
8. On January 30, 1978, the Agency held a hearing at 
which Appellant was asked to respond to the charges against him. 
9. By letter dated January 30, 1978, the Agency terminated 
Appellant from his employment effective January 31, 1978. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Council makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Appellant, in his position of Security Officer/Security 
Driver, State Youth Development Center, comes within the Utah State 
Merit System and, therefore, is subject and entitled to all the 
protections, rules and regulations provided by said system. 
2. Under the provisions of Section 67-13-14 (a), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), Merit System employees may be dismissed for reasons 
of inefficiency, insubordination, or nonfeasance in office. 
3. Under the provisions of Section 67-13-14(b), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), in any appeal from a charge of inefficiency, 
where the charge is supported by credible evidence, there is a rebutt-
able presumption in favor of the Agency, with the burden of proof 
4. Based upon the evidence presented, there is sufficient 
credible evidence to support the Agency's charge of Appellant's in-
efficiency, and the Appellant has failed to rebut the presumption 
which arises therefrom. 
5. Based upon the evidence presented, Appellant's dismis-
sal by the Agency for reasons of inefficiency, insubordination and 
nonfeasance in office is supported by the evidence and was, there-
fore, justified and should be upheld. 
OPINION 
At the beginning of the hearing of this appeal the question 
was raised by counsel for Appellant as to whether the period given 
by the Agency to the Appellant to respond at the Agency hearing to 
the charges against him was legally sufficient. As indicated in 
the aforementioned Findings of Fact, the written notice of charges 
was received by Appellant on Friday, January 27, 1978, and the hear-
ing before the Agency head was held the following Monday, January 30, 
1978. 
Section 67-13-14(c), Utah Code Annotated (1953), provides 
that: 
"Except in aggravated cases of misconduct, no person 
shall be demoted or dismissed from a tenure position with-
out the following procedures: 
(1) Notification in writing by the department head 
of the reasons for discharge. 
(2) The employee shall have an opportunity to reply 
and have his reply considered by his department head. 
(3) An opportunity to be heard by his department head 
or designated representatives. 
(4) Following such a hearing an employee may be dismis-
sed or demoted if the department head finds adequate cause 
or reason. 
(5) If the department head finds that retention of any 
employee would endanger the peace and safety of others or 
pose a grave threat to the public interest, such employee 
may be summarily suspended pending administrative hearings 
and merit system council review." 
As is apparent, the above quoted provisions provide no 
guidance with respect to the question of the period of time requir-
ed between the notification in writing of the reasons for discharge 
and the opportunity to reply and be heard. The Council, however, 
believes that such period of time must be reasonable in light of 
the circumstances surrounding the dismissal. Certainly, in most 
instances, three days including a weekend would not be reasonable. 
However, for the reasons stated below, it is the Council's opinion 
that in this rather limited factual situation the notification was 
reasonable. 
Appellant is a Security Officer at the State Youth Develop-
ment Center which is essentially a correction and rehabilitation 
facility for minors. Testimony during the hearing made it apparent 
that there exists at the facility a substantial concern for security. 
At times circumstances and events threaten the health and safety of 
both students and staff. Under these circumstances it is essential 
that all Security Officers strictly adhere to the written "Excep-
tions" (including those appearing in the Findings of Fact) which 
are part of their job description. Failure to adhere to these expect-
ations immediately places the safety of others in danger. 
The herein-quoted statutory language provides that if the 
retention of an employee "would endanger the peace and safety of 
others" the employee may be summarily suspended pending administra-
tive hearings and Merit Council review. While this provision does 
not directly touch upon the issue of notice timing, the Council 
feels that it does imply a legislative intent to expedite dismissal 
proceedings wherein the peace and safety of others are endangered. 
Since the peace and safety of others were endangered by Appellant's 
actions or failure to act, and since the notice was followed by a 
thorough hearing before the Agency head, the Council feels that the 
notice provided was reasonable. Again, however, we stress that 
under most circumstances such notice would be unreasonably short. 
It is the decision of the Council, that based upon the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellant was 
justifiedly terminated by the Agency for reasons of inefficiency, 
-4-
insubordination and nonfeasance. Therefore/ the decision of the 
Agency terminating Appellant is hereby upheld and affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 1978. 
UTAH STATE MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL 
By /k^L rS/fe^lz^ 




Rule 20.0 - SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A HEARING 
Personnel Review Board, 1981 
UTAH PERSONNEL REVIEW BOARD 
STATE EMPLOYEES' 
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL 
PROCEDURES 
1981 EDITION 
The statutory basis for the Utah State Employees1 Grievance and Appeal 
Procedures is set forth in the Utah Personnel Management Act, which originated 
as Senate Bill 179 (1979)• That act became effective July 1, 1979. Senate 
Bill 73, enacted in the 1980 legislative session, provided relevant amendments 
to the original bill; and in 1981 Senate Bill 271 made further provision for 
amendments essential to the grievance and appeals process. Statutory 
references may be found at § 67-19-18, §§ 67-19-20 through 67-19-25 and 
§ 67-19-29, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and in the corresponding 
annual volumes of Laws of Utah. 
presentation of the case by the party present. 
19.3 - If a requested witness does not appear at the hearing, such 
failure shall not necessitate the postponement of any proceedings. 
19.4 - The testimony of witnesses shall be under oath or 
affirmation. 
19.5 - The Executive Secretary as well as the Hearing Officer have 
been granted authority by statute to subpoena witnesses at the Step 5 
hearing. 
19.6 - If additional witnesses are to be called which were not 
identified at a Pre-hearing Conference, they shall be identified to the 
opposing party and to the Hearing Officer at the onset of the hearing. 
20.0 SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A HEARING 
20.1 - Upon commencement, the Hearing Officer shall announce that 
the hearing is convened and shall direct the reading into the record of 
the original grievance issue, and will note for the record all subpoenas 
issued and all appearances. 
20.2 - The State shall bear the burden of proof in all appeals 
resulting from dismissals, demotions, suspensions and other disciplinary 
actions. The Employee shall bear the burden of proof in all other 
appeals. (§ 67-19-25(5) UCA) 
20.3 - The Hearing Officer has discretionary authority to 
determine which party shall proceed first with the case. Witnesses may 
be cross-examined. All exhibits offered by and in behalf of the Agency 
shall be marked in consecutive numerical order. 
20.4 - The Appellant's evidence shall be presented in the same 
manner as the Agency's evidence, with witnesses and exhibits. Each of 
the Appellant's exhibits will be marked in consecutive numerical order. 
20.5 - Opening statements may be made, and each of the parties may 
offer rebuttal evidence within the discretion of and/or by order of the 
Hearing Officer. 
20.6 - Closing statements, at the conclusion of the presentation 
of evidence, may be made by the representative or counsel for both 
parties. No rebuttal statements may be made by either of the parties at 
the proceedings' conclusion. As appropriate, the time for oral argument 
may be limited by the Hearing Officer. 
20.7 - After all proceedings have been concluded, the Hearing 
Officer will dismiss and/or excuse witnesses and declare the hearing 
closed. Either party may tender written briefs to the Hearing Officer 
within a time limit specified by the latter. If briefs are to be 
submitted, the record will remain open until such time as the briefs are 
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received and thus incorporated into the record. Then, the Hearing 
Officer will declare that his or her decision will be announced within 
due and proper time following consideration of all matters presented at 
the hearing. 
20.8 - The Hearing Officer, following the full and complete 
hearing, will make and enter a written decision and order containing 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Such decision and order will be 
filed by the Hearing Officer with the Personnel Review Board Executive 
Secretary and will, without further action, become the decision and order 
of the Board as a result of the hearing. 
20.9 - The Hearing Officer shall determine the quantum of proof. 
21.0 EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
21.1 - Prior to every hearing, the Agency is to designate its 
representative who is entitled to remain throughout the hearing to 
represent the Agency at any proceeding. Neither the Employee nor the 
Agency representative shall be excluded. The Department Head or Agency 
Director, or designate, may represent the Agency during the hearing. 
ADDENDUM E 
Utah Admin. Code R140-1-20.C (1989) 
Administrative Rules Of The 
Career Service Review Board 
R140-M through R140-1-22 
Issued pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated %67-19a-203 (Supp. 1989) 
Effective December 15, 1989 
Capitol Hill 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
R140-1-19 PUBLIC HEARINGS 
The parties shall be entitled to an open and public hearing unless the exclusionary rule 
is invoked or unless there are reasonable grounds to justify an executive session. 
A. Closing Hearings All grievance procedure hearings shall be open to the public, except 
for situations in which the administrator, the board, or the hearing officer closes by 
executive session either a portion of the hearing or the entire hearing, when 
substantial reason exists for not having an open hearing. 
1. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing may be closed in part or in its entirety when the 
proceeding involves questions about an employee's character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health. 
2. Authority to close meetings is set forth in the Utah Open and Public Meetings 
Act, §52-4-5(1). 
B. Sealing Evidence The administrator, the board, or the hearing officer may exercise 
authority to seal the record when circumstances so warrant. 
C. Media Presence All hearings at the evidentiary/step 5 and appellate/step 6 levels 
are open to the media, unless otherwise closed due to R140-1-19A above, except that 
television cameras shall not be permitted at the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings. 
D. Dissemination The administrator has discretion to release copies of legal decisions, 
orders, and rulings to a media representative upon the latter's request. Portions of 
or entire legal decisions and orders may be withheld if deemed to be of a privileged 
or confidential nature, or if the record is sealed. 
R140-1-20 EVIDENTIARY/STEP 5 HEARINGS 
A. Authority of Hearing Officers The hearing officer is empowered to: 
1. maintain order, insure the development of a clear and complete record, rule 
upon offers of proof, and receive relevant evidence; 
2. set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative testimony and exclude any 
witness whose later testimony might be colored by the testimony of another 
witness or any person whose presence might have a chilling effect on another 
testifying witness; 
3. rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed findings; 
4. require the filing of memoranda of law and the presentation of oral argument 
with respect to any question of law; 
5. compel testimony and order the production of evidence and the appearance of 
witnesses; and 
6. admit evidence that has reasonable and probative value. 
B. Conduct of Hearings A hearing shall be confined to those issues related to the 
subject matter presented in the original grievance statement. 
1. An evidentiary proceeding shall not be allowed to develop into a general inquiry 
into the policies and operations of an agency. 
2. An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely for the purpose of receiving 
evidence which either refutes or substantiates specific claims or charges. It shall 
not be made an occasion for irresponsible accusations, general attacks upon the 
character or conduct of the employing agency or the employee or others, or for 
making derogatory assertions having no bearing on the claims or specific matters 
under review. 
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new hearing 
for the record, with both parties being accorded full administrative due process. The 
hearing officer shall give latitude and deference to an agency's prior decision when 
the latter is supported by the findings of fact based on the evidence. 
D. Discretion Upon commencement, the hearing officer shall announce that the hearing 
is convened and is henceforth on the record. The hearing officer shall note 
appearances for the record and shall determine which party has the burden of 
moving forward. 
E. Closing of the Record After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments 
have been presented, the hearing officer shall close the record and terminate the 
proceeding, unless one or both parties agree to submit a posthearing brief within a 
specified time. 
R Posthearing Briefs When posthearing briefs or memoranda of law are scheduled to 
be submitted, the record shall remain open until the briefs are received by the 
hearing officer and incorporated into the record, or until the time to receive such 
briefs has expired. After receipt of posthearing documents, or upon the expiration 
of the time to receive posthearing documents, the case is then taken under 
advisement, and the tolling period commences for the issuance of the written 
decision. 
G. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law Following the closing of the record, the hearing 
officer shall make and enter a written decision containing findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. The decision and order is filed with the administrator and 
without further action becomes the decision and order of the evidentiary hearing. 
H. Disseminating Decisions The administrator shall disseminate copies of the decision 
and order to the persons of record for each party. 
I. Past Work Record In those proceedings where a disciplinary penalty is at issue, the 
past employment record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either mitigating 
or sustaining the penalty in the event that the employee is found guilty of the 
disciplinary charge alleged. 
J. Scope of Remedy/Relief If the hearing officer finds that the action complained of 
which was taken by the appointing authority was too severe, even though for good 
cause, the hearing officer may provide for such other remedy or relief as deemed 
appropriate and in the best interest of the respective parties. 
K. Compliance and Enforcement State agencies and officials are expected to comply 
with decisions and orders issued by a hearing officer, unless an appeal is taken to the 
appellate/step 6 level. Enforcement measures available to the board include: 
(1) involving the governor, who may remove most state officers with or without 
cause, and with respect to those who can only be removed for cause, refusal to obey 
a lawful order may constitute sufficient cause for removal; (2) a mandamus order 
to compel the official to obey the order; and (3) the charge of a Class A 
misdemeanor. 
L. No Rehearings Rehearings are not permitted. 
M. Reconsideration A request for a reconsideration may be made in writing within ten 
working days after the date that an evidentiary/step 5 decision is received by the 
party. The written request is to contain specific reasons as to why a reconsideration 
is warranted with respect to the factual findings and conclusions of the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision. The original hearing officer shall decide on the propriety 
of a reconsideration. A request for reconsideration is filed with the administrator. 
Any appeal to the board from a reconsideration by the original hearing officer must 
be filed with the administrator within ten working days upon receipt of the 
reconsideration. 
67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board. 
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the board 
if: 
(i) the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administrator within ten working days 
after the receipt of the decision or the expiration of the period for decision, whichever is first; 
and 
(ii) the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal established in Subsection (2). 
(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of the hearing to the administrator. 
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the board only 
if the appealing party alleges that: 
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days after the hearing adjourned; 
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision; 
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an incorrect or arbitrary interpretation 
of the facts; or 
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erroneous conclusion of law. 
67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing • Evidentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) The board shall: 
ADDENDUM F 
Jerry Fisher v. Adult Probation and Parole, 1 PRB/H.O. 1 (1979) 
BEFORE THE PJEfc§9SN£L REVIEW BOARD HEARING OFFICER 
IN THE HATTER OF THE APPEAL ) 
) 
of JERRY R~ FISHER ) 
3&is matter came 3>efore the duly assigned Hearing Officer as a regularly 
scheduled hearing on Xhe first day of Hovember, 1979* -pursuant to the appeal of 
"Mr. Jerry ^ * *isher <hereinafter ^ Appellant") * ram M s dismissal as a Probation 
and Parole Officer, Division of Corrections (Hereinafter "Agency")- Appellant 
was present and represented by his attorney, Brent X* Johns and Hr. Tom 
HantrelX. The Agency was represented by £arl Dorins of the Office of the Utah 
Attorney General. 
Oral testimony and -documentary evidence vere presented to the Hearing Office 
at that time which included a Zape recording of a lover level departmental Admin-
istrative hearing held April 24, 1979, and the findings, conclusions^and decision 
of the hearing officer* This Hearing Officer being duly advised in the premises, 
makes and ente-r* the following findings of fic^, cwc? •**'*«•*«* *** 1**? r*»d decisior: 
PIND'iTOS OF PACT 
1. The Appellant at the time of his terminat£o&^R&s~ employed by * the Agency 
as a Probation and Parole Officer, Grade 21* 
2« On or about March 14, 1979, a meeting was held between the appellant am 
representatives of the Agency concerning his performance as a probation 
officer, at the conclusion of which Appellant was informed that he shou 
either resign or he would be terminated from his position* 
3* On or about March 19, 1979, Appellant contacted a representative of the 
Agency and indicated that he would not submit his resignation. 
4* Dncr about Harch 19, 1979, Appellant was informed that he had been tei 
urinated and the Agency prepared an "Employee Termination Form which 
listed the reason for termination as '"unsatisfactory performance*'* 
5. On or about Harch 19, 1979, Appellant notified the Agency, in writing t 
his desire to appeal the decision to terminate and requested the Agenc 
provide him with a list -of specific allegations* 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECISION 
HO 7<M 
6. On or about March 23, 2979, the Agency sent Appellant written notificatio 
of his right to appeal the termination in an administrative hearing bef or 
the Division of Corrections prior to his requested Merit System Council 
Hearing and Included copies of his Termination Form, separation notice, 
leave slip, and requested allegations* 
7. On or about April 19, 1979, Appellant was contacted hy the Agency and 
-advised that he had been reinstated with the Agency, that he would be 
£iven back pay and that an administrative hearing would be held en April 
,24, 1979, to appeal the Agency's decision to terminate. 
3. On or about April 24, 1979, Appellant was present at an Administrative 
Hearing before the Division of Corrections and given the opportunity to 
present his grievance and respond to the reasons given for the Agency's 
Intent to dismiss him* 
S. On or about April 30, 1979, the Administrative Hearing Officer issued a 
decision which upheld the Agency's requested action and terminated 
Appellant as a Probation and Parole Officer. The decision of the Hearing 
Officer, issued on or about April 30, 1979, was subsequently modified in 
that Appellant's termination date was effective June 19, 1979. 
10. On or about May 29, 1979, Appellant requested in writing, a hearing bef or 
the State Merit System Council to appeal the Hearing Officer's decision. 
U . Delays and postponements of a hearing before the Merit System Council as 
well as passage of the State Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Annotate 
1953 SeSion 67-19-1, et seq., which came into effect on July 1, 1979, 
resulted in this matter coming before this Hearing Cfficer rather than tl 
Merit ^ Council ^as directed by the newly established grievance procedure* 
12. The reasons given for Appellant*s dismissal involved charges of mis-
feasance, unsatisfactory performance, malfeasance, nonfeasance and mis-
conduct while in office, which occurred, primarily, between November 13, 
1978 and March 13, 1979, in that Appellants 
<a) bailed to properly proceed with a work release order granted 
by a circuit court judge on a Steven Bailey; 
4jb} 4ki or .about December A-, 1978, -was contacted by an agent of 
*he Salt Xake Probation Office, «fced to -aid in an interdistric 
presentence report and do a c o l l a t e r a l contact , which was part c 
Appellant's job assignment, and indicated an unwil l ingness t o 
comply with the request$ 
(c) Cn or about February 5 , 2979, requested permission from h i s 
supervisor to attend a Job-related seminar with the understands 
that h i s work assignments were completed f o r that time period 
and that i t was subsequently discovered t h a t two presentence r e 
ports had not been completed f o r t h a t time p e r i o d ; 
Cd) On or about T«bruary 3 , 1979, was ass igned t o cover" Layton 
Circuit Court, phoned the Agency t o report an i l l n e s s a f t e r 
the Court had contacted the Agency -to r e p o r t t h e absence of 
a required agent , talked with a s e c r e t a r y , not h i s superv i sor , 
and could mot be reached at h i s home l a t e r In t h e day when 
the Agency attempted to contact him; 
<e) Ja i l ed to use the Agency s ign-out board, making i t d i f f i c u l t 
for the Agency secre tar ies to schedule appointments for him 
or locate him once he l e f t the o f f i c e ; 
( f ) On or about March 12, 1 9 / 9 , contacted the Agency, spoke with a 
secretary and indicated that he would not be i n the o f f i c e untj 
Harch 14. Appellant was asked i f he'd l i k e to -talk to h i s supt 
v i s o r , as employee regulat ions require that annual l eave must 1 
approved by a supervisor before taken, and he decl ined t o do s< 
(g) Tailed to complete a presentence report on Eldon Bailey due i n 
Bountiful Circuit Court on March 9 , 1979, i n order for t h e judj 
t o ^review the recommendations p r i o r to sentencing on March 1 2 ; 
OO Tailed to s i g n and de l iver a presentence report to h i s supervi 
for h i s signature and approval on Barbara Von Kol l in pr ior t o 
sentencing before the Clearf ie ld C i r c u i t Court; 
( i ) On or about March 12 , 1979, f a i l e d t o present himself t o the 
layton Circuit Court to review and make recommendation i n the 
case of Charles Mormon; 
( j ) On or about November 1978, was s i n g l e d out by Judge Browning i 
communication to Appellant*s supervisor a s a d i f f i c u l t Individ 
(k) In the opinion of Judge Thornley Swan, a s communicated t o 
Appel lant's supervisor on or about February 27 , 1979, was overl: 
punit ive i n h i s recommendations and possessed questionable 
a b i l i t y In making decis ions from mater ia l s he 'd gathered; and 
(1) In the opinion of three attorneys , George Duimenti, Steven Oda, 
and John Hutchinson, had dea l t with t h e i r c l i e n t s i n an unneede 
Judgmental manner, drawn conclusions without evidence and 
general ly a l ienated many of these - individuals • 
J 3 . From a period beginning on or about September 1 6 , 1976, through. October 
1978, Appellant received standard, sa t i s fac tory and above standard evalu-
a t i o n s on Il ls Employee Ferf ormance Appraisal (UP-17) done by t h e Agency, 
the l a s t appraisal being sat i s factory for the per iod November 1 6 , 1977 
through October 1978. 
1 4 . Appellant's Employee Performance Appraisal (UP-17) f o r November 1978 
through March 15 , 1979 was unsatisfactory with a recommendation for 
termination. 
15 . Prior to Appellant's meeting with h i s supervisor and another reprcsentat^ 
of the Agency on or about March 14, 1979, Appellant was not s p e c i f i c a l l y 
warned that h i s act ions would r e s u l t in termination with the Agency. 
16 . Appellant was verbalfyinformed of h i s supervisor 's d ispleasure over certi 
of the acts detai led i n Paragraph 12 of these f i n d i n g s . 
17. Appellant received some professional and supervisory counseling i n 1977 
and 1978, and t h i s was known by Appellant's superv i sor , but not r e f l e c t e 
in h i s UP-17 Appraisal through October 1978. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact , the Hearing Of f i cer makes and -enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
X. Appellant, i n h i s pos i t i on as Probation and Parole Of f i cer , Grade 2 1 , 
Divis ion of Corrections came under the Provis ions of the State Personnel 
Management Act^ which replaced the Utah State *{erit System as of Ju ly 1, 
1979, and therefore i s subject t o and e n t i t l e d t o a l l the protect ion 
rules and regulations provided by that Act which incorporates protect ior 
* and r ight s afforded employees under the Utah S t a t e Merit System* 
"2. tinder the s ta tutory and regulatory provis ions c o n t r o l l i n g the operat ion 
of "the Merit System (repealed July 1 , 1979) and the Utah State Personne 
from their department heads or designated Teprcscauiux»w «-ww^*.M*n& 
the reasons for discharge, an opportunity to reply to such charges (under 
the Management Act the time period specified is five working days) , and 
have the reply considered by the department head, and an opportunity 
:to be heard by the department head before the employee may be dismissed 
or otherwise terminated. 
3. Under the provision of Section 67-19-18 (1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which incorporates tne substance of Section 67-13-14 under the repealed 
Jierlt System, dismissals shall be only to advance the good
 0f t|ie public 
service, or for -such causes as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to main 
-tain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty 
-Jto orders of a "superior, misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance In 
office. 
4. Based upon the evidence presented, Appellant's dismissal by the Agency 
.for reason of unsatisfactory performance, nonfeasance, and failure to 
tnalntatn skills or adequate performance levels was justified and shall 
l>e upheld* 
DECISION 
This case been presented several difficult problems relating to both substance 
and procedure. Tirst with respect to procedure, the actual hearing of this matter 
before the instant Hearing Officer occurred approximately seven and one-half months 
after Appellant was notified of his initial termination. This inordinate pro-
longation is a direct result of a number of factors, the first of which was the 
Agency's apparent failure to initially comply with Appellant's right to receive 
written notification of the reasons for discharge before termination. Appellant 
did not receive written notification at either the March 14, 1979, meeting or on 
March 19, 1979, when the Agency prepared his Employment Termination Form. 
This procedural defect was subsequently corrected when Appellant was mailed 
a copy of the reasons for discharge on March 23, 1979, and then -notified by the 
Agency, on or about April 19, 1979, that he Tiad been reinstated and could appeal 
the Agency's intent to dismiss in a departmental administrative hearing scheduled 
for April 24, 1979. Appellant appeared at the April 24th Hearing and was rer 
presented by Tom Cantrell. Appellant was given the opportunity to present his 
grievance at that time* The Hearing Officer, in an opinion issued six* days later, 
upheld the Agency's intent to terminate and the Appellant appealed this decision 
to the Merit System Council. Belays occurred in scheduling the requested hearing 
before the Council and, in the interim, the Merit appeal procedure was replaced 
by the State Tersonnel Management Act which further delayed the appeal process. 
Now that the new grievance procedure is operational* it is the belief of this 
Hearing Officer that grievances will be resolved more expeditiously* 
Appellant has complained of other possible violations of procedural due pro-
cess by the Agency* He indicated that he had not received any warning or indicatio 
of termination prior to his March 14th Meeting with his supervisor* Appellant's 
immediate supervisor did indicate, however, that on various occasions he met with 
Appellant wand advised him of complaints and deficiencies in Appellant's job per-
formance. During ^ the course of the hearing -It became apparent that written notifi-
cation of conduct which could result -±a dismissal, other than that notification 
prescribed by the Management Act. is not a standard practice of the Agency* The 
Agency dsfnot required by law or regulation to give such warnings but this Hearing 
Officer xecommends that Jtfie Agency consider the implementation of some such prograi 
*r, >at -the very least, written documentation of discussion with employees on per-
formance deficiencies or related problems* 
Turning to the substance of this appeal, this officer is confronted with the 
problem of an employee who received standard or above standard performance apprais. 
from September 1976 through late October or early November of 1978* His last ap-
praisal, which extended from November 1978 through March 1979 * was unsatisfactory 
and the events which occurred during that period of time were the primary reasons 
given for his dismissal by the Agency. It is not the intent of this Officer to 
second guess the actions taken by the Agency. However, other disciplinary action 
could well have been considered, i.e. placement of the Appellant on conditional st 
for a period of time, demotion, etc., and utilized prior to the Agency's notifica-
tion of its intent to dismiss the Appellant. This recommended action is not a 
specific requirement under present state rules and regulations but certainly seems 
consistent and appropriate within the spirit and purpose of :the Personnel 
Management Act* In order to handle performance problems In an efficient and 
effective way, the Agency would do well to consider the implementation of some 
such program, adaptable to the particular needs of both the Agency and its 
employees. 
Appellant did not actively dispute the fact that the events complained of 
did or could have occurred as presented by the Agency. On more than one occasion, 
d^uring this hearing and that held by the Division of Corrections, he conceeded 
-that he had made judgmental ^ errors* Appellant indicated that he 4±d not view his 
conduct as unsatisfactory .and that no such indication was. 
until the 4iate of the March 14th meeting. A brief review of the findings dc>ps, 
however, show an accumulation of 1ess than satisfactory performance by the 
A pp. JLiiiiL, Appellant failed to follow proper procedures in the Bailey work 
release matt ex-, Mv -clim nol complete the appropriate paper work. . He did not 
notify the circuit court judge ai that Bailey should not 
given work release. In effect* !* disregarded - - e; *- < 
^rery possibly the rights Hof Hr. Bailey* Be compounded his mistake by failing L 
communicate with his supervisor on the matter« 
In *he inter district present ran «t> i qui it BJIIJI e ollateral • contact incident, Appe 
lant Indicated that he was* attempting to update his case fllea piioi, fin a ! 'I IT we we 
vacation and may well have rold -the agent that he was too busy Xo do the contact. 
Appellant was the assigned agent for the report* The responsibility was his and 1 
•matter could simply have been resolved by Appellant requesting one of the other 
-agents HI IIJ.J oilier in h;iinlli« the lu.jftex or informing his supervisor that he was 
too busy l"i ile it hut tiui il needed ir 1 • taken 
Appellant failed to complete two pre-sentence reports that vere due while he 
i * % related seminar, work t'u*r Fhould have heei' comnleted prior t 
t t ; notified his supervisoi or asked some other a 
i these matter *r •, nr I aid luy l he ji.uminar, ton I ht.: failed to do s 
The Layton court incident presents another instance when Appellant should ha 
exercised more sound -jucigppnt , He lett the court, ill, on February 5, 1979, at 
approximately Hi uB „i in wnnouf contacting his office, thereby making no provisd 
for a replacement- Subsequent I y, hi (or" nice! the office, after the Court bod 
-called and complained, told a secretary hu was ill, .and would not be in lor i. tie 
rest of the day.. Appellant made mo attempt to talk with his supervisor at that 
time and unsuccessful.attempts were made in an effort to contact him at his home 
lal.fi In t he day* 
Appellant's supervisor was notified by one ol the oil:ice secretaries I.IiaL t 
Appellant was not. conscientious in using the sign-out boardt making it, difficult 
schedule appointments. Appellant failed to con,tact his supervisor and olitfaiii 
advance clearance, for annual leave which he took on March .12, 13 and the morning 
.March'l 4th kppel larif's super v isor testified that the Agency1 s policy is that i 
annual leave must be cleared in advance with an employee's supervisors* When 
tHe Appellant called the Agency on March 12, he compounded his mistake by de-
clining to talk -with his supervisor at that time* His absence resulted in his 
failure to complete presentence reports on Eldon Bailey and Barbara Von Kollin. 
Be also missed an -appearance in Court in the case of Charles Mormon* No attempt 
-was made -to tell his supervisor or fellow workers that these matters needed 
.attention. 
The-remaining charges stem from complaints, letters and .conversations with 
judges and attorneys relating to their dealings with Appellant on a professional 
basis. In ills defense, Appellant lias submitted numerous letters from professionals 
whom he dealt with during the course of his employment, with the Agency* The 
Agency's charges Indicate Appellant's problem In dealing with judges and attorneys 
while Appellant's exhibits reflect positive associations with other professionals 
Appellant had to deal with* These have been appropriately weighed and considered 
by this Hearing Officer* 
As noted above, the Appellant Indicated that even though he had made some 
mistakes and judgment errors, they certainly did not justify his termination 
nor was he even warned that any of these instances would lead to his dismissal* 
If each incident could be isolated and viewed separately, then perhaps a 
strong case could be made for just such an argument, at least in regards to some 
of the Agency's reasons for dismissal. However, it is the view of this Officer 
that the reasons given by the Agency, in their totality, are sufficient to warrant 
dismissal. The Appellant's supervisor testified that on several occasions he had 
counseled with the Appellant in regard to liis job performance. Testimony was alsc 
given that some .attempts were made at professional counseling* 
Therefore, it is the decision of this Hearing Officer, that based upon the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appellant was justifiedly 
terminated by the Agency for reasons of unsatisfactory performance, nonfeasance* 
and failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels* Therefore, the 
decision of the Agency terminating Appellant is hereby upheld and affirmed* 
DATED this 13th day of December, 1979.. By 
Jaraesr h\ Wilson, Hearing Examiner 
for the/ 
D n r e n n n n l l J o v i G W B o a r d 
ADDENDUM G 
Utah Code Ann § 67-19-25(5] (1979) 
Laws of Utah 197^, Chapter 139, Section 31 
[805] LABOR IN GENERAL Ch. 139 
(2) A reasonable amount of time during work hours to confer with the 
representative and prepare the grievance; 
(3) Freedom from reprisals for use of the procedure; and 
(4) Call other employees as witnesses at an appeal hearing and such 
employees shall be allowed to attend and testify at the hearing if reasonable 
advance notice is given to the witnesses* immediate supervisor. 
Section 29. Section enacted. 
Section 67-19-23, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read 
67-19-23. Employees processing appeal—Failure to answer—Appeal 
steps—Waiver for failure. 
U) Failure to answer an employee's appeal within the time specified 
automatically grants the aggrieved employee the right to process the appeal 
to the next step. 
(2) Any appeal step, or any time limits specified at any step, may be 
waived or extended by mutual agreement in writing between the aggrieved 
employee and the person to whom the appeal is directed. 
(3) Failure to process an appeal from one step to the next step within 
the time specified is deemed a waiver by the aggrieved employee of any 
right to process the appeal further or to appeal to any court; the appeal 
being deemed settled on the basis of the last step. 
Section 30. Section enacted. 
Section 67-19-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to ic ad: 
67-19-24. Appeals—Limitations of actions. 
(1) No appeal shall be submitted under this chapter unless (a) it is sub-
mitted within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the appeal or 
(b) within 20 working days after the aggrieved employee has knowledge of 
the event giving rise to the appeal. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) (b), no employee may submit an 
appeal more than one year after the event giving rise to the appeal, nor 
does any person who has voluntarily terminated his or her employment with 
the state have any standing thereafter to submit an appeal. 
Section 31. Section enacted. 
Section 67-19-25, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
67-19-25. Appeals—-Procedure—Evidence—Decisions—Personnel review 
board—Judicial review—Discrimination in hiring. 
An aggrieved employee appealing an administrative action shall observe 
the following procedural steps: 
(1) An aggrieved employee shall first attempt to resolve a grievance 
through discussion with the employee's immediate supervisor. 
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(2) If the grievance submitted under subsection (1) remains unanswered 
for five working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dis-
satisfied with the decisions reached, the appeal may be resubmitted in writ-
ing to the employee's immediate supervisor within five working days after 
the expiration of the period for answer or receipt of the decision, whichever 
is first. The immediate supervisor shall render a written decision under this 
step within five working days after submission of the appeal. 
The employee shall, upon submission of the appeal to the immediate 
supervisor, notify the executive secretary of the personnel review board 
that the employee has initiated the appeaL The executive secretary shall 
upon receipt of the notification of the appeal attempt to settle the complaint 
by conference, conciliation and persuasion. If the executive secretary 
believes that the grievance is one that the agency does not have the author-
ity to resolve, he may, with the concurrence of the employee and the 
agency, waive the requirement for a decision by the immediate supervisor 
and subsections (3) and (4) of the grievance procedure and submit the griev-
ance directly to the hearing officer under subsection (5). He also shall 
attempt to resolve the dispute by informal means with the director. 
(3) If the appeal submitted under subsection (2) remains unanswered for 
five working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatis-
ifed with the decision reached, the appeal may be submitted in writing to 
the employee's second level supervisor within ten working days after the 
expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is 
first. A written decision under this step setting forth the reasons for deci-
sion shall be rendered within five working days after submission of the 
appeal. 
(4)' If the appeal submitted under subsection (3) remains unanswered for 
five working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatis-
ifed with the decision reached, the appeal may be submitted in writing to 
the employee's department head within ten working days after the expira-
tion of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
A written decision under this step setting forth the reasons for the decision 
shall be rendered within ten working days after submission of the appeaL 
(5) If the appeal submitted under subsection (4) remains unanswered for 
ten working days after submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatis-
fied with the decision reached, the appeal may be submitted in writing to 
the hearing officer within ten working days after the expiration of the 
period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. Written 
notice of the time and place for hearing shall be given to the aggrieved 
employee at least five days before the date set for hearing which shall be 
set not later than 15 days after submission of the grievance or at a time 
agreed upon by the aggrieved employee and the hearing officer. 
Informal rules of evidence and procedure are applicable at such hearings. 
The aggrieved employee and employer may, in addition to the provisions of 
section 67-19-22, be present at all hearings, produce witnesses, examine and 
cross examine witnesses, and examine documentary evidence. A tape 
recording of the proceedings shall be made and the transcript of the pro-
ceedings shall constitute the record of the hearing. 
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The hearing officer shall render a written decision supported by findings 
of fact and conclusions of law within 15 working days after the hearing. 
(6) If no decision is rendered under subsection (5) within 15 working 
days after the hearing, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with a 
decision on appeal from dismissal or if the aggrieved employee or applicant 
alleges that a decision of the hearing officer was based on incorrect or arbi-
trary interpretation of facts or that a matter of law is in dispute, the appeal 
may be submitted in writing, together with a transcript of the hearing con-
ducted under subsection (5), to the personnel review board within ten work-
ing days after the expiration of the period of decision or upon receipt of the 
decision, whichever is first. Written notice of the time and place for hearing 
by the board shall be given to the aggrieved employee or applicant at least 
five days before the date set for the hearing which shall be held not later 
than 15 days after submission of the appeal, except that in the case of an 
appeal in which the aggrieved employee alleges discrimination the board 
may set a date for the hearing later than 15 days after submission of the 
appeal. In a hearing before the personnel review board on an appeal from a 
dismissal or demotion based upon inefficiency where the charge is supported 
by credible evidence, there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the 
employer, except that if the employer has failed to comply with the provi-
sions of section 67-19-18, the burden of proof and persuasion shall be upon 
the employer. Evidentiary and procedural rules and rights with respect to 
representation and witnesses described in subsection (5) are applicable in 
hearings of the board. The board may subpoena witnesses and compel testi-
mony in the conduct of its hearings. Hearings of the board shall be 
recorded and the complete transcript of a hearing shall constitute the record 
of the hearing. 
The personnel review board shall render a written decision within 15 
working days after the hearing. The decision of the board is binding upon 
the aggrieved employee and upon the agency whose action caused the 
appeal. The board may, at its discretion, order that an employee be placed 
on the reappointment roster provided for in section 67-19-17 for assignment 
to another agency. The aggrieved employee or the agency may appeal the 
decision of the personnel review board to the district court of the district in 
which the position is located or to the district court of Salt Lake County. 
On appeal to the district court, the board's findings of fact, if supported by 
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. 
(7) An applicant for a position in Utah state government who alleges dis-
criminatory or unfair employment practices in hiring as defined in section 
34-35-6, may submit a complaint in writing to the executive secretary who 
shall attempt to settle the complaint by conference, conciliation and persua-
sion. If the applicant remains dissatisfied with the decision reached after 
ten working days following the submission of the complaint, the applicant 
may submit the complaint in writing to the hearing officer under subsection 
(5) and shall thereafter be entitled to the rights of appeal as provided in sub-
sections (5) and (6). 
Section 32. Section enacted. 
Section 67-19-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read: 
ADDENDUM H 
lit , ih ( od i nnw UU h?-]'> 1H d i n l (i (,' upf 1 9 9 1 ) 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-16, enacted by L. minimum of 5 days" following "director" in 
1979, ch. 139, § 22; 1983, ch- 332, § 8; 1991, Subsection (2)(a)(i); rewrote Subsection (3), 
ch. 204, § 4. which read The director shall validate the ex-
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- amining instruments, consulting with agency 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added the Sub- officials
 a nd outside experts toward this end": 
section (l)(a) and (2Xa) designations and the
 i n f i e r t e d « n o t ^ ^ ^ 
subsection designations» .therein; designated
 d u r e s i d e d i n ^ c h a ^ . Cfa 
tfae/ormer second[and third sentences of Sub-
 9 ^ Grievance and Appeal Price-
section (5) as Subsections (6) and (7); added , ,„ . * , , . . , ,. . . .. 
Subsections (l)(b), (1X0, and Subsection (2Kb); d u r e f • * \ d "* d * ^ > * • ? ^ ^ m a t i o n 
substituted, in Subsection (lXa), Except as ^ alleged Tenure following appeal in Sub-
provided in Subsection (b), appointments" for 8 e c t l 0 n ™> a n d m a d e m m o r *yl**te c h a n & e s 
"Appointments" deleted "but in every case a throughout the section. 
67-19-17. Reappointment of employees not retain* 
empt position. 
Any career service employee accepting an appointment to an exempt posi-
tion who is not retained by the appointing officer, unless discharged for cause 
as provided by this act or by regulation, shall: 
(1) be appointed to any career service position for which the employee 
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to the employee's last position in the 
career service provided an opening exists; or 
(2) be appointed to any lesser career service position tor which the 
^employee qualifies pending the opening of a position described in Subsec-
tion (1) of this section. The director shall maintain a reappointment regis-
ter for this purpose and it shall have precedence over other registers. 
History: C. 1953, 6/ 1!) Ji, enacUti by L Cross-References. — Grievance and ap 
1979, ch. 139, § 23. peals procedure, dismissal of employee, place-
Meaning of "this act". — See nnt<» undpi merit on reappointment roster at discretion of 
same catchline under § 67-19-11. board, § 67-19-25. 
67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disci-
plinary action — Procedure — Reductions in 
force. 
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted only to advance 
the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency, incom-
petency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordi-
nation, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or 
nonfeasance in office. 
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, physical 
handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit fac-
tor including the exercise of rights under this chapter. 
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural ami docu-
mentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions. 
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with 
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would 
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public 
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal 
to the department head as provided in Subsection (5). 
(5) (a) No career service employee may be demoted or dismissed unless the 
department head or designated representative has complied with this 
subsection. 
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the em-
ployee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have 
the reply considered by the department head. 
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department 
head or designated representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted 
if the department head finds adequate cause or reason. 
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of 
workload, or lack of work are governed by retention rosters established by 
the director. 
(b) Under those circumstances: 
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be 
eliminated, subject to review by the director. 
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated be-
fore any career service employee, 
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order of 
their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be 
discharged first. 
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be 
computed according to rules established by the director allowing 
appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in 
state government, including any active duty military service ful-
filled subsequent to original state appointment, 
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in 
force shall be: 
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsec-
tion 67-19-17(2); and 
(B) reappointed without examination to any vacancy for which 
the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of the 
date of the separation. 
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to 
the department head for an administrative review. 
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 working days 
after the employee's receipt of written notification of separation. 
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head 
according to the grievance and appeals procedure of this act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 139, § 24; 1983, ch. 332, § 9; 1991, 
ch. 204, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, divided former 
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) 
through (3); redesignated former Subsections 
(2) through (4) as present Subsections (4) 
through (6); in Subsection (5), added the Sub-
section (a) designation and redesignated for-
mer Subsections (a) through (d) as present Sub-
sections (b) through (e); in Subsection (6), 
added the (a), (b), (b)(iv)(A) and (B), and (c)(ii) 
and (iii) designations, added Subsection 
(b)(iii)(A), and redesignated former Subsec-
tions (a) through (e) as Subsections (b)(i), 
(b)(ii), (bXiiiXB), (b)(iv) and (cXi), respectively; 
and made minor stylistic and punctuation 
changes throughout the section. 
( I1! '"I \ mlafion a misdemeanor. 
Any person who knowingly violate a piovisiou ni i lira chapter is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, t> t l l ) i l i mm U Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
1979, ch. 139, § 35. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
67-19-30. Grievance resolution — Jurisdiction. 
(1) Employees shall comply with the procedural and jurisdictional require-
ments of this section, Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and Chapter 19a, Title 67, Grievance and Appeal Procedures, in seeking reso-
lution of grievances. 
(2) All grievances based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression, 
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, com-
mission, or condition shall be governed by Chapter 19a, Title 67, Grievance 
and Appeal Procedures, and Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
(3) All grievances involving classification or schedule assignment shall be 
governed by Section 67-19-31 and are exempt from the procedures of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act. 
(4) Altgrievances by applicants for positions in state government involving 
an alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice shall be gov-
erned by Section 67-19-32 and Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Proce-
dures Act. 
(5) A "grievance" under this chapter is a request for agency action for 
purposes of Chapter 46b, Title 63, Administrative Procedures Act. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19-30, enacted by L. from the procedures of in Subsection (3), and 
1989, ch. 191, § 3; 1991, ch. 204, § 6. made minor stylistic changes throughout the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- section 
ment, effective April 29,1991, inserted wGnev- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, Chapter 191 
ance and Appeal Procedures" following Title became effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to 
67" in Subsections (1) and (2), "are exempt Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
67-19-31. Classification or position schedule assignment 
grievances — Procedure. 
(1) Upon receipt of a classification or position schedule assignment griev-
ance, the administrator of the Career Service Review Board shall refer the 
grievance to the director. 
(2) (a) The director shall assign the grievance to a classification panel of 
three or more impartial persons trained in state classification procedures. 
(b) The classification panel shall determine whether or not the classifi-
cation assignment was appropriate by applying the statutes, rules, and 
procedures adopted by the department that were in effect at the time of 
the classification or schedule change. 
(c) The classification panel may: 
(i) obtain access to previous audits, classification decisions, and 
reports; 
(ii) request new or additional audits by department or agency per-
sonnel analysts; and 
(iii) consider new or additional information. 
(d) The classification panel may sustain or modify the original decision 
or make a new decision. 
(e) The classification panel shall report its decision and findings to the 
director, who shall notify the grievant. 
(3) (a) Either party may appeal the panel's decision to a classification com-
mittee appointed by the director. 
(b) The director shall appoint a classification committee composed of 
three or more department directors representing both large and small 
agencies to hear the appeal 
(r) The classification comimtt<< ilnill IV 11K classification unii 
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CHAPTER 19a 





As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrator" means the person employed by the board to assist 
in administering personnel policies. 
(2) "Board" means the Career Service Review Board created by this 
chapter. 
(3) "Career service employee",means a person employed in career ser-
vice as defined in Section 67-19-3. 
(4) "Employer" means the state of Utah and all supervisory personnel 
vested with the authority to implement and administer the policies of the 
department. 
(5) "Grievance" means: 
(a) a complaint by a career service employee concerning any mat-
ter touching upon the relationship between the employee and his 
employer; and 
(b) any dispute between a career service employee and his em-
ployer. 
(6) "Supervisor" means the person to whom an employee reports and 
who assigns and oversees the employee's work. 
History: C. 1953, 67-!9a-101, enacted by The 1991 amendment by ch 204, effective 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 6; 1991, ch. 101, § 2; 1991, April 29, 1991, substituted "a career service" 
ch. 204, § 7. for "an" in present Subsections (5Ha) and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- (5Kb), 
ment by ch. 101, effective April 29,1991, added This section is set out as reconciled by the 
present Subsection (3); designated former Sub- Office of Legislative Research and General 
sections (3) to (5) as present Subsections (4) to Counsel. 
(6); and substituted "the policies of the depart- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
mem" for "the state's personnel policies" at the came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
end of present Subsection (4). Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
PART 2 
•CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created — Mem-
bers — Appointment — Removal — Terms — Or-
ganization — Compensation. 
(1) There is created a Career Service Review Board. 
(2) (a) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall ap-
point five members to the board no more than three of which are members 
of the same political party. 
(b) The governor shall appoint members whose gender and ethnicity 
represent the career service work force. 
(c) The governor may remove any board member for cause and appoint 
a replacement to complete the unexpired term of the member removed for 
cause. 
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(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations and merit system 
principles in public employment; and 
(b) are not: 
(i) members of any local, state, or national committee of a political 
party; 
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any partisan political 
club; and 
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office. 
(4) (a) The governor shall appoint board members to serve four-year terms 
as follows: 
(i) three members shall be appointed to a term beginning and end-
ing with the governor's term; and 
(ii) two members shall be appointed to four-year terms beginning 
January 1 of the third year of the governor's regular term in office. 
(b) The members of the board shall serve until their successors are 
appointed and qualified. 
(c) Persons serving on the board as of the effective date of this act may 
complete the term for which they were appointed. 
(d) If a vacancy occurs on the board, the governor may appoint a new 
person to fill the unexpired term. 
(5) Each year, the board shall choose a chairman and vice-chairman from 
its own members. 
(6) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of 
business. 
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action 
of the board. 
(7) Members of the board shall serve without compensation, but they may 
be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties 
as established by the Division of Finance. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-201. enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 7. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1969, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-202. Powers — Jurisdiction. 
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review 
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about 
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equita-
ble administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concern-
ing abandonment of position that have not been resolved at an earlier 
stage in the grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other person-
nel matters. 
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural 
time limits established in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act. 
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other pro-
ceeding, any member of the board may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-202, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 191, * 8; 1991, ch. 101, f 3; 1991, 
ch. 204, % 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment by ch. 101, effective April 29,1991, added 
Subsection (3)(d), making a related grammati-
cal change, and made a change in the style of 
the chapter reference in Subsection (2). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective 
April 29,1991, inserted "career service" before 
"employees" in Subsection (lKa), and "Admin-
istrative Procedures Act" after Title 63" in 
Subsection (2). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
The board may make rules governing: 
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the grievance pro-
cess established by this chapter; 
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the 
waiver of time limits established by this chapter; 
(3) the application for and service of subpoenas, the service and filing 
of pleadings, and the issuance of rulings, orders, determinations, sum-
mary judgments, transcripts, and other legal documents necessary in 
grievance proceedings; 
(4) the use, calling, attendance, participation, and fees of witnesses in 
grievance proceedings; 
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings; 
(6) procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless gov-
erned by Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act; 
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance proceedings; and 
(8) procedures for sealing files or making data pertaining to a griev-
ance unavailable to the public. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-203, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 9. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-204. Administrator — Powers. 
(1) The board shall employ a person with demonstrated ability to adminis-
ter personnel policies to assist it in performing the functions specified in this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) The administrator may: 
(i) assign qualified, impartial hearing officers on a per case basis to 
adjudicate matters under the jurisdiction of the board; 
(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence in conjunc-
tion with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding; 
and 
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to whom the subpoena 
is directed and upon notice to the party who issued the subpoena, 
quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an exces-
sive number of witnesses, or requests evidence not relevant to any 
matter in issue. 
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under authority of this 
section, the administrator shall appoint hearing officers that have demon-
strated by education, training, and experience the ability to adjudicate 
and resolve personnel administration disputes by applying employee rela-
tions principles within a large, public work force. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-204, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989. ch. 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, f 10; 1991, ch. 101, 6 4. came effective on April 24, 1969. pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment. effective April 29, 1991, added Subsec-
tion (2)iaKiii; and made related changes. 
PART 3 
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES 
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and ap-
peals procedure. 
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career service employees 
who are not: 
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work force; 
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivisions; 
(c) public employees covered by other grievance procedures; or 
(d) employees of state institutions of higher education. 
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an employee is 
qualified to use this grievance procedure, the administrator shall resolve the 
question or dispute. The administrator's decision is reviewable only by the 
Court of Appeals. 
(3) Any career service employee may submit a grievance based upon a 
claim or charge of injustice or oppression, including dismissal from employ-
ment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for solution 
through the grievance procedures set forth in this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 67.198-301, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 11; 1991, ch. 101, § 5. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991f added Subsec-
tions (1) and (2) and designated the former sec-
tion as Subsection (3). 
67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges submissible 
under grievance and appeals procedure. 
(DA career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demo-
tions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel 
rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions 
in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of 
grievance procedure. 
(2) (a) A career service employee may grieve all other matters only to the 
level of his department head. 
(b) The decision of the department head is final and unappealable to 
the board. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-302, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 12; 1991, ch. 204, { 9. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "A 
career service" for "An aggrieved" in Subsec-
tion (1). 
67-19a-303. Employees9 rights in grievance and appeals 
procedure. 
(1) For the purpose of processing a grievance, a career service employee 
may: 
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act 
as an advocate at any level of the grievance procedure; 
(b) request a reasonable amount of time during work hours to confer 
with the representative and prepare the grievance; and 
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance hearing. 
(2) The state shall allow employees to attend and testify at the grievance 
hearing as witnesses if the employee has given reasonable advance notice to 
his immediate supervisor. 
(3) No person may take any reprisals against any career service employee 
for use of grievance procedures specified in this chapter. 
(4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may not 
place grievance forms, grievance materials, correspondence about the 
grievance, agency and department replies to the grievance, or other docu-
ments relating to the grievance in the employee's personnel file. 
(b) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may 
place records of disciplinary action in the employee's personnel file. 
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is rescinded through 
the grievance procedures established in this chapter, the agency and the 
Department of Human Resource Management shall remove the record of 
the disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel file and 
central personnel file. 
(d) An agency may maintain a separate grievance file relating to an 
employee's grievance, but shall discard the file after three years. 
History: C. 1953, 67.19a303, enacted by Effective Datea. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 13; 1991, ch. 204, § 10. came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25. 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "a 
career service*' for "an" in Subsection (1). 
PART 4 
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY 
AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE 
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by ag-
grieved employee — Voluntary termination of 
employment — Group grievances. 
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the re-
strictions contained in this part, a career service employee may have a griev-
ance addressed by following the procedures specified in this part. 
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may 
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits 
specified for those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402. 
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the 
administrator. 
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the 
next step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived 
his right to process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the griev-
ance. 
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the 
next step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is 
considered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step. 
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review un-
der this chapter only if the employee submits the grievance: 
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the griev-
ance; or 
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of 
the event giving rise to the grievance, 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(a), an employee may not submit a 
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance. 
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state 
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment. 
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same grievance, they may sub-
mit a group grievance by following the procedures and requirements of 
this chapter. 
sign the complaint. 
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a 
class action, but may select one aggrieved employee's grievance and ad-
dress that grievance as a test case. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-401, enacted by former Subsections (3) to (6) as present Subeec-
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 14; 1991, ch. 101, § 6; tions (4) to (7). 
1991, ch. 204, I 11. The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- April 29, 1991, substituted "a career service" 
ment by ch. 101, effective April 29, 1991, sub- for "an aggrieved" in Subsection (1). 
sututed "grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time This section is set out as reconciled by the 
limits specified for those grievance steps, as Office of Legislative Research and General 
outlined in Section 67-19a-402" for "any griev- Counsel. 
ance step or the time limits specified for any Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
grievance step" at the end of Subsection (2); came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
added present Subsection (3); and redesignated Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved 
employee. 
(1) (a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall 
attempt to resolve the grievance through discussion with his supervisor. 
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with 
him, the employee's supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the griev-
ance. 
(2) (a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its 
submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervi-
sor's verbal decision, the employee may resubmit the grievance in writing 
to his immediate supervisor within five working days after the expiration 
of the period for response or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the employee's supervisor shall issue a written response to the 
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervi-
sor, the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has 
submitted the written grievance. 
(3) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor re-
mains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the 
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee 
may submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division director 
within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or 
receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the employee's agency or division director shall issue a written 
response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the 
decision. 
(4) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or divi-
sion director remains unanswered for five working days after its submis-
sion, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, 
the employee may submit the grievance in writing to his department 
head within ten working days after the expiration of the period for deci-
sion or receipt of the decision, whichever is first. 
(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is 
submitted, the department head shall issue a written response to the 
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision. 
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except 
those matters that the board may review under the authority of Part 3. 
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head 
meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the griev-
ance remains unanswered for ten working days after its submission, or if the 
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may 
submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working days 
after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, which-
ever is first. 
67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator — uunsaiuuuum 
hearing. 
(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the 
administrator under the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator 
may attempt to settle the grievance informally by conference, conciliation, 
and persuasion with the employee and the agency. 
(2) (a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator under 
the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator shall determine: 
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service employee and is 
entitled to use the grievance system; 
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; 
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard, 
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection (2), the 
administrator may: 
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may present 
oral arguments, written arguments, or both; or 
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file. 
(3) (a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional hearing, he shall issue his 
written decision within 15 days after the hearing is adjourned. 
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an administrative review of 
the file, he shall issue his written decision within 15 days after he re-
ceives the grievance. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-403, enacted by Subsections (2>(aKi> through (2>(aKiii) as 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 16; 1991, ch. 204, § 13. present Subsections (2HaKii) through (2Kahiv). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, added present came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
Subsection (2)(a)(i) and redesignated former Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
67-19a-4Q4. Administrator's responsibilities. 
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets the jurisdictional 
requirements of Part 3, he shall: 
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint; and 
(2) set a date for the hearing that is either: 
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the administrator issues 
his decision that the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; or 
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the administrator. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-404, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 17. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-
67-19a-405. Prehearing conference. 
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each party, the represen-
tatives of each party, and other designated persons at a prehearing confer-
ence. 
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require the parties to: 
(a) identify which allegations are admitted and which allegations are 
denied, 
(b) submit a joint statement detailing: 
(i) stipulated facts that are not in dispute; 
(ii) the issues to be decided; and 
(iii) applicable laws and rules; 
(c) submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and papers or other evidence 
that each party intends to offer as evidence; and 
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance. 
(3) At the conclusion of the prehearing conference, the administrator may 
require the parties to prepare a written statement identifying: 
(a) the items presented or agreed to under Subsection (2); and 
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearing process. 
(4) The prehearing conference is informal and is not open to the public or 
press. 
67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved 
employee — Hearing before hearing officer — 
Evidentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) (a) The administrator shall employ a certified court reporter to record 
the hearing and prepare an official transcript of the hearing. 
(b) The official transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits, briefs, 
motions, and pleadings received by the hearing officer are the official 
record of the proceeding. 
(2) (a) The agency has the burden of proof in all grievances resulting from 
dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, reductions in 
force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position. 
(b) The employee has the burden of proof in all other grievances. 
(c) The party with the burden of proof must prove their case by sub-
stantial evidence. 
(3) (a) The hearing officer shall issue a written decision within 20 working 
days after the hearing is adjourned. 
(b) If the hearing officer does not issue a decision within 20 working 
days, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not liable for any 
claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due. 
(4) The hearing officer may: 
(a) not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party; 
(b) close a hearing by complying with the procedures and requirements 
of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act; 
(c) seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if the evi-
dence raises questions about an employee's character, professional compe-
tence, or physical or mental health; 
(d) grant continuances according to board rule; and 
(e) decide questions or disputes concerning standing in accordance with 
Section 67-19a-301. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-406, enacted by Subsections (4 Hd) and (4)(e); and made stylistic 
L. 1989, ch. 191, f 19; 1991, ch. 101, § 7. changes and appropriate changes in phraseol-
Axnendxnent Notes. — The 1991 amend- ogy. 
merit, effective April 29, 1991, inserted the Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 he-
subdivision designation "(a)" in Subsection (4); came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
designated former Subsections (5) and (6) as Utah Const. Art. VI Sec. 25. 
present Subsections (4Kb) and (4)tc); added 
67-19a-407. Appeal to Career Service Review Board. 
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's deci-
sion on a grievance to the board if: 
(i) the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administra-
tor within ten working days after the receipt of the decision or the 
expiration of the period for decision, whichever is first; and 
(ii) the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal estab-
lished in Subsection (2). 
(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of 
the hearing to the administrator. 
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on 
a grievance to the board only if the appealing party alleges that: 
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days 
after the hearing adjourned; 
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision; 
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an 
incorrect or arbitrary interpretation of the facts; or 
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erro-
neous conclusion of law. 
History: C. 1953, 67»19a-407, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, I 90. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 he-
67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing — Evi-
dentiary and procedural rules. 
(1) The board shall: 
(a) hold a hearing to review the hearing officer's decision not later than 
30 days after it receives the official transcript and the briefs; 
(b) review the decision of the hearing officer by considering the official 
record of that hearing and the briefs of the parties; and 
(c) issue its written decision addressing the hearing officer's decision 
within 40 working days after the record for its proceeding is closed. 
(2) In addition to whatever other remedy the board grants, it may order 
that the employee be placed on the reappointment roster provided for by 
Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another agency. 
(3) If the board does not issue its written decision within 40 working days 
after closing the record, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not 
liable for any claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due. 
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party. 
(5) The board may close a hearing by complying with the procedures and 
requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, the Open and Public Meetings Act. 
(6) The board may seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if 
the evidence raises questions about an employee's character, professional 
competence, or physical or mental health. 
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-408, enacted by came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to 
L. 1989, ch. 191, $ 21. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 191 be-
ADDENDUM J 
Utah Code Ann. § 6 4 - 1 3 - 2 8 ( 1 ) (1993) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS — STATE PRISON 64-13-29 
64-13-27. Records — Access. 
(1) (a) The Law Enforcement and Technical Services Division of the De-
partment of Public Safety, county attorneys' offices, and state and local 
law enforcement agencies shall furnish to the department upon request a 
copy of records of any person arrested in this state. 
(b) The department shall maintain centralized files on all offenders 
under the jurisdiction of the department and make the files available for 
review by other criminal justice agencies upon request in cases where 
offenders are the subject of active investigations. 
(2) All records maintained by programs under contract to the department 
providing services to public offenders are the property of the department. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-27, enacted by L. at the end of the present provision and a second 
1985, ch. 211, § 22; 1987, ch. 116, § 20; 1989, sentence that read T h e department shall 
ch. 224, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, $ 374. maintain an accurate audit record of informa-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985, tion provided to other programs or agencies re-
ch. 211, § 22 repeals former fe 64-13-27, as en-
 g a rding offenders under its jurisdiction." 
acted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, § 27, relating to
 T h e 1 9 9 3 amendment, effective July 1,1993, 
vacancy in office of warden, and enacts the
 8 u b s t i t u t ed "Law Enforcement and Technical 
above section. Services Division of the Department of Public 
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1989 amend-
 S a f e t „ for . , g t a t e B u r e a u o f C r i m i n a l I d e n t i f i . 
» 5 ! ^ ^ ^ cation" in Subsection (IK.). first and second sentences of Subsection (1) as 
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) and, in Subsection , _ , . _
 0 _.Al ._ _, x 
(2), deleted "and shall be returned to it when a n * Technical Services, Title 53 Chapter 5. 
Cross-References. — Law Enforcement 
d Technical Services, Title 53, Chapter 5. 
the offender is'ter^nated" fro^Tthe^rogr'am" Government records, Title 63, Chapter 2. 
64-13-28. Hearings involving staff or offenders. 
(1) The department shall maintain an administrative hearing office to con-
duct hearings regarding offenders in the custody of the department, issues 
involving staff, or any other administrative matters as assigned by the execu-
tive director of the Department of Corrections. The hearing officer may issue 
subpoenas, compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, pa-
pers, and other documents, administer oaths, and take testimony under oath. 
(2) The hearing officer shall maintain a summary record of all hearings and 
provide timely written notice to participants of the decision and the reasons 
for the decision. 
History: C. 1953, 64-13-28, enacted by L. ch. 211, § 23 repeals former S 64-13-28, as en-
1985, ch. 211, § 23; 1987, ch. 116, $ 21; 1988, acted by Laws 1977, ch. 253, ft 28, relating to 
ch. 191, § 2. interference with prison activities, and enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985, the above section. 
64-13-29. Violation of parole or probation — Detention — 
Hearing. 
(1) The department shall ensure that the court is notified of violations of 
the terms and conditions of probation in the case of probationers under the 
department's supervision, or the Board of Pardons in the case of parolees 
under the department's supervision. In cases where the department desires to 
detain an offender alleged to have violated his parole or probation and where 
it is unlikely that the Board of Pardons or court will conduct a hearing within 
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ADDENDUM K 
Archer v. Board of State Lands and Forestry 
Case No. 940214, Slip Opinion, October 11, 1995 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
John D. Archer and Ashley No. 940214 
Creek Phosphate Company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Board of State Lands and Forestry, 
State of Utah; Director, Division 
of State Lands and Forestry, 
State of Utah, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Attorneys: E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Steven F._Alder, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants 
Peter Watson Billings, Jr., Denise A. Dragoo, 
Brock R. Belnap, Salt Lake City, for intervenor 
FS Industries 
Leonard John Lewis, Thomas W. Clawson, Salt Lake 
City, for intervenor Chevron Pipeline Company 
DURHAM, Justice; 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment by the 
district court upholding an order of the Board of State Lands and 
Forestry. We affirm. 
On May 28, 1985, the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry (the Division) granted Chevron Pipeline Company 
(Chevron) an easement across state school trust lands. The 
purpose of the easement was to allow Chevron to build a pipeline 
to carry slurried phosphate from Vernal, Utah, to Rock Springs, 
Wyoming. In 1985, the Utah Public Service Commission prohibited 
the'transportation of phosphate by truck, requiring instead that 
phosphate be transported by slurry pipeline* 
Chevron knew that the pipeline was to be operated as a 
common carrier subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC). However, in 1986, Chevron commenced exclusive 
F I L E D 
October 11, 1995 
operation of the pipeline despite plaintiff Ashley Creek 
Phosphate's (ACP) objection that Chevron had not published a 
tariff, as required by the Interstate Commerce Act. In 1989, 
Chevron complied with an ICC order requiring it to publish rates 
for shipment on the pipeline. Later that same year, ACP, the 
lessee of Utah school trust lands, and the State brought actions 
against Chevron, challenging the reasonableness of the pipeline 
rates and alleging antitrust violations. The antitrust suit has 
been suspended while the ICC determines whether the Chevron 
tariff is reasonable. 
In 1992, Chevron sought approval- from the Division to 
assign its easement to FS Industries. ACP asked the Division not 
to approve the assignment and further asked the Division to 
terminate Chevron's easement across state lands on the basis of 
Chevron's failure to publish a tariff. Upon receiving the 
request to terminate the easement, the Division met with the 
parties and decided to approve the assignment rather than 
terminate the easement. In response, ACP filed a petition for 
consistency review with the Board of State Lands and Forestry 
(the Board). After an informal hearing, the Board affirmed the 
Division's decision. ACP then filed an action in Utah's Third 
District Court for a trial de novo. FS Industries and Chevron 
filed motions to intervene, which were granted. The district 
court upheld the Board's order and entered summary judgment 
against ACP. ACP now appeals, raising the following issues: 
(1) whether ACP lacks standing to challenge the district court's 
decision approving the assignment of the easement to FS 
Industries; (2) whether the district court correctly concluded 
that termination of the easement was not mandatory but was within 
the discretion of the Division's Director; and (3) whether the 
district court considered the best interests of the school trust 
lands in its decision not to terminate the easement and to 
approve the assignment to FS Industries. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hiaains 
v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). On appeal 
from summary judgment, we accord the trial court's legal 
conclusions no deference but review them for correctness. Malone 
v. Parker. 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992); Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). When reviewing the 
facts supporting the order, we view them in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Baldwin v. Burton. 
850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993). Because this case is a review 
of an administrative adjudicative proceeding, we must ensure that 
the district court complied with the requirements of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-4(5) . 
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Under UAPA, "[t]he district courts shall have 
jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions 
resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-15(1)(a). This section requires that the district 
court's review of informal adjudicative proceedings be performed 
by holding a new trial rather than by reviewing the informal 
record. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). The State argues that where the governing statute grants 
discretion to an administrative agency, the standard of review in 
a trial de novo of an informal administrative proceeding should 
be limited to determining whether the agency's decision was 
reasonable in view of the facts presented at the district court. 
In other words, the State argues that the district court's de 
novo review of an informal proceeding'should defer to the 
reasonable exercise of statutorily delegated discretion to the 
Division. We disagree. 
Instead, we note with approval and adopt the rule 
previously used in two decisions from the Utah Court of Appeals 
establishing the right to a new trial without deference to the 
determinations of an informal administrative proceeding. Id. at 
452 (fl [D] istrict court does not have discretion to review an 
informal adjudicative proceeding by any method other than a trial 
de novo, as mandated by UAPA.f!); Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 
P.2d 587, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (finding absolute right to 
trial de novo when informal hearing is held under UAPA). This 
rule guarantees the district court the opportunity to correct any 
deficiencies that may arise because of the informal nature of 
administrative proceedings and provides an adequate record for 
future review. Cordova. 861 P.2d at 452; see also Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & Forestry. 830 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1992) (finding that formal administrative 
proceedings "allow the opportunity for fuller discovery and fact 
finding, [and] are more likely to result in an adequate record"). 
Thus, pursuant to section 63-46b-15(l)(a), review by trial de 
novo means a new trial with no deference to the administrative 
proceedings below. Accordingly, we examine, without deference, 
the district court's legal conclusions and determine whether, on 
de novo review, the district court properly granted summary 
judgment. See East Jordan Irrigation Co. v. Morgan. 860 P.2d 
310, 312 (Utah 1993); Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989) . 
STANDING 
FS Industries argues that ACP lacks standing to 
challenge the Director's decision. When determining questions of 
standing, we rely on the factors articulated in Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Utah 1983). Jenkins requires that a 
party seeking standing demonstrate only one of the following: 
(1) a personal stake in the controversy and some causal 
relationship between"the injury, the governmental actions, and 
the relief requested; (2) that no other party has a greater 
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interest ^  in the outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely 
to be raised at all unless the present party has standing to 
raise them; or (3) that the issues are of such great public 
importance that they ought to be decided in furtherance of the 
public interest. Id. 
In this case, ACP has standing under the first Jenkins 
criterion. As the lessee of state school trust lands, ACP owns 
the right to use the easement through its access to Chevron's 
common carrier pipeline. Effective denial of this right would 
cause ACP to suffer direct injury because the pipeline represents 
the only legal method available to ACP for transporting phosphate 
to commercial markets. Therefore, ACP has standing. 
TERMINATION OF THE EASEMENT 
ACP argues that termination of the easement was 
mandatory because Chevron did not immediately publish a tariff 
upon commencing operation of the pipeline in 1986. However, even 
assuming that Chevron's failure to publish a tariff in 1986 is a 
violation of the law, rule 640-40-1700 of the Utah Administrative 
Code vests discretion in the Director of the Division to 
determine whether the violation justifies termination. This rule 
states: 
Any easement granted by the Division 
across state land may be terminated in whole 
or in part for failure to comply with any 
term or conditions of the conveyance document 
or applicable laws or rules. Upon 
determination bv the Director that an 
easement is subject to termination pursuant 
to the terms of the grant or applicable laws 
or rules, the Director shall issue an 
appropriate instrument terminating the 
easement. 
Utah Admin. Code R640-40-1700 (emphasis added). Statutes and 
administrative rules should generally be construed according to 
their plain language. See Brinkerhoff v. Forsvth. 779 P.2d 685, 
686 (Utah 1989). Thus, in reviewing a statute or am 
administrative rule, we read each term literally unless such a 
reading is unreasonably inoperable or confused. See Morton Int'l 
Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991). 
The language of this rule is not ambiguous. The rule 
clearly states that the Director may, not shall, terminate the 
easement for violations of the law. ACP ignores the first 
sentence of the rule, focusing instead on the second half of the 
second sentence, which states that "the Director shall issue an 
appropriate instrument terminating the easement." ACP argues 
that this part of the second sentence absolutely requires the 
Director to terminate the easement for any violation of the law. 
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However, the rule predicates this result on the Director's 
"determination" that the easement is terminable. If the Director 
had no discretion, the need for a "determination" would be 
surplusage. Thus, the plain language of the rule grants 
discretion to the Director to determine whether a violation of 
the law warrants termination of the easement. 
In addition, we note that this construction of the rule 
is consistent with good policy and common sense. A requirement 
that the Director automatically terminate an easement for every 
violation of federal, state, or local law, ordinance, or 
regulation would create an administrative nightmare. Under ACP's 
interpretation, even the most minor and isolated violation would 
require mandatory termination, ACP attempts to address this 
problem by arguing that after mandatory termination, 
reinstatement of an easement would be possible if reinstatement 
were shown to be in the best interests of the trust. Such a 
process would be cumbersome and wasteful and does not seem a 
plausible construction of the rule. If the Director deems a 
violation serious, the Director can terminate the easement under 
the discretion granted in rule 640-40-1700. But if the Director 
deems a violation to be minor or cured, the Director can exercise 
discretion not to terminate the easement. Allowing the Director 
the discretion not to terminate the easement for minor or even 
cured violations ensures that the Director can act in the best 
interests of the trust. 
In this case, although Chevron's failure to publish a 
tariff in 1986 was arguably a violation of the law, Chevron 
complied with a subsequent FCC order to publish rates in 1989. 
There is nothing in the record which indicates that ACP had 
operational capacity to ship or even mine phosphate in 1989, let 
alone in 1986. Thus, the alleged violation appears to have 
caused little, if any, injury, and a discretionary response from 
the Director seems entirely appropriate. Therefore, this Court 
finds that the district court correctly concluded that rule 
640-40-1700 grants the Director the discretion to determine 
whether a violation warrants termination of the easement. We 
note, however, that rule 640-40-1700 dees not grant the Director 
unfettered discretion to terminate the easement, because the 
Director is always bound to act in the best interests of the 
trust. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 525 (Utah 1994) (finding that the state 
has "irrevocable duty to manage these trust lands for the sole 
benefit of the common schools"). 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TRUST 
An examination of the district court's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law establishes that on de novo review the 
court considered the best interests of the trust and correctly 
concluded not to terminate the easement. In exercising 
discretion to terminate the easement, the Director is bound to 
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act in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries. See 
National Parks & Conservation Assoc, v. Board of State Lands, 869 
P.2d 909, 916 (Utah 1993) (finding that trustee's duty of loyalty 
requires state to act solely for benefit of trust). The Director 
must: 
(a) seek to maximize trust land revenue, 
consistent with the balancing of short and 
long-term interests so that long-term 
benefits are not lost in an effort to 
maximize short-term gains; 
(b) maintain integrity of the trust and 
prevent misapplication of its lands and 
revenues through prudent management; and 
(c) make the interest of the school and 
institutional trust beneficiaries paramount. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-4(2) (Supp. 1995)- 1 
In sum, in keeping the interests of the trust 
paramount, the Division must manage state school trust lands in 
the "most prudent and profitable manner possible." Colman v. 
Utah State Land Bd.. 403 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1965). 
ACP argues that the district court failed to consider 
the best interests of the trust in concluding not to terminate 
the easement. However, the record shows that even though the 
district court may not have specifically enumerated the interests 
of the trust, it did consider the trust's best interests in 
deciding not to terminate the easement. The court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law demonstrate a recognition that trust 
lands were involved and an understanding of the nature of the 
fiduciary obligations involved. The court stated in its findings 
of fact that "the Director had exercised his discretion in a 
manner consistent with the rules, and statutes and that the 
decision was consistent with the best interests of the trust 
beneficiaries." The court also stated in its conclusions of law 
that in exercising trust duties, the State must maximize trust 
land revenue in a manner "that would serve the best interest of 
the beneficiaries within the provisions of applicable law." 
1
 Effective July 1, 1994, the State Lands Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 65A-1-1 to -10 (Supp. 1995), and the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Management Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 53C-1-101 to -306 (Supp. 1995), were amended in part to place 
management authority for school and institutional trust land 
assets under the provisions of the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Management Act. 
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The district court correctly concluded that termination 
of the easement before the ICC has adjudicated the reasonableness 
of the tariff would not benefit the school trust lands. ACP, 
however, argues that terminating the easement will benefit the 
trust and posits the following reasoning: More money is in the 
best interests of the trust; the trust is not acquiring more 
money because ACP's mine is not operating; ACP's mine is not 
operating because the rates are unreasonably high; if the" 
easement is terminated, the tariffs will have to be lowered; 
therefore, the easement must be terminated until a lower tariff 
is set; and by lowering the tariff, ACP will begin mining and 
start shipping phosphate across the pipeline and paying royalties 
to the trust. This argument is flawed because it begins and ends 
with the assumption that rates are unreasonable, which is a 
determination that belongs exclusively to the ICC and has not yet 
been made. See Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick 
& Tile Co.. 450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981); see also Burlington 
Northern. Inc. v. United States. 459 U.S. 131, 141 (1982) 
(finding that "primary jurisdiction to determine the 
reasonableness of rates lies with the [ICC]"). 
In view of the fact that the ICC has exclusive 
jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of this tariff and 
is currently in the process of doing so, it is not in the best 
interests of the trust for this court to terminate the easement, 
thereby circumventing those proceedings and forcing FS Industries 
to close its mine. Such action by the court could subject the 
trust to potentially expensive litigation with Chevron and FS 
Industries if the ICC eventually upholds the reasonableness of 
the proposed tariff, and furthermore, it is not clear that 
terminating the easement"will provide any benefit to the trust.2 
For instance, even if this court were to terminate the easement, 
the State does not have the authority to set specific rates that 
would allow ACP to mine and ship phosphate. And if the State. 
were to take the further step of terminating and then reissuing 
the easement conditioned upon providing fair access to ACP, the 
determination of "fair access" would still be in the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the ICC. See Maislin Indus.. U.S., Inc. v. 
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 119 (1990) (finding that "ICC 
has primary responsibility for determining whether a rate or 
practice is reasonable"). 
Conversely, if the court does not terminate the 
easement and the ICC eventually determines that the rates are 
unreasonable, claims filed by the Division in the current ICC 
proceeding and pending antitrust suit protect the interests of 
the trust's beneficiaries. Finally, by approving the assignment 
2
 In addition, if the ICC determines that the rates which 
Chevron published and FS Industries adopted are reasonable, then 
the Division might well face a claim for substantial damages 
resulting from the closure of the FS mine. 
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of the easement from Chevron to FS Industries, the Division is 
not precluded from pursuing remedies for damages, through ICC 
proceedings or the pending antitrust litigation. 
In conclusion, it is not in the best interests of the 
trust to terminate the easement because such action would be 
inconsistent with the possibility that the ICC may eventually 
uphold the reasonableness of the proposed tariffs. Therefore, 
the district court correctly concluded that rule 640-40-1700 is 
discretionary and that the Director exercised this discretion in 
the best interests of the trust. We affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
Chief Justice Zimmerman, Justice Howe, and Justice 
Russon concur in Justice Durham's opinion. 
Associate Chief Justice Stewart concurs in the result. 
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